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I. INTRODUCTION
In most states with the death penalty, juries sentence;' in most
capital punishment states where juries do not sentence, judges sen-
tence. 2
 In Florida, Alabama, and Indiana, juries and judges sen-
tence: The jury renders a nonbinding sentencing recommendation,
which the judge may follow or disregard."
' Twenty-nine jurisdictions with presumptively valid capital statutes allow a death sen-
tence only if the jury votes for death, unless the defendant has requested sentencing by the
court. See 49 U.S.C. § 1473(c) (1982); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1301 (1977); CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 190.3 (West 1988); Cow. REV. STAT. § 16-11-103 (1986 & Supp. 1987); CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 53a-46a (1983); DEL. CODE ANN. Lit, II, § 4209 (1987); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 17-10.30 to 17-
10-32 (1982); ILL.. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-I (Supp. 1984); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 532.025(1)(b) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1985); LA. CODE OHM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.8 (West
Supp. 1988); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413 (1987); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch . 279, §§ 68,
70 (West Supp. 1988); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101 (Supp. 1987); Mo. REV. STAT. § 565.006
(Supp. 1982); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630.5 (1986 & Supp. 1987); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:1 I-
3 (West 1982 & Supp. 1988); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-3 (1987); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-
2000 (1983); OHIO REV, CODE ANN. § 2929.03 (Baldwin 1986); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21,
§ 701.11 (West 1988 & Supp. 1988); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(f) (Purdon 1982); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 16.3-20 (Law Co-op. 1985 & Supp. 1987); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-
27A-4 (1988); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2-203 (1982); TEX. GRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 37.071
(Vernon 1981 & Supp. 1988); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-207 (Supp. 1983); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 19.2-264.4 (1983); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.030 (Sup!), 1988); Wvo. STAT. § 6-2-102
(1983). In Nevada, the jury is given responsibility for imposing the sentence in a capital case,
but if the jury cannot agree, a panel of three judges may impose sentence. NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 175.554, 175.556 (Michie 1986).
2
 In Arizona, Idaho, Montana, and Nebraska, the court alone imposes sentence. ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13.703 (Supp. 1983-1984); IDAHO CODE § 19-2515 (1987); MON•I'. CODE
ANN. § 46-18-301 (1987); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2520 (1985),
3 FLA. STAT, § 921.141 (1983); AEA. CODE § 13A-5-46 (1982); IND. CODE § 35-50-2-9
(Supp. 1984). The capital sentencing provisions of Kentucky and Ohio refer to the jury's
sentencing determination as a "recommendation." Ky. REV. STAT. § 532.025(1)(b) (Michie/
Bobbs-Merrill 1985) (jury shall "recommend a sentence for the defendant"); Ott to REV. CODE
ANN. § 2929.03(D) (Baldwin 1986) ("If the trial jury recommends that the sentence of death
be imposed upon the offender, the Court shall proceed to impose sentence pursuant to .. .
this section."). Under neither statute, however, may a trial judge increase a life recommen-
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This article examines the constitutionality of capital sentencing
schemes that divide sentencing responsibility between judges and
juries. The United States Supreme Court recently addressed the
capital sentencing responsibility issue in a somewhat different —
although, I will argue, analogous context in Caldwell v. Mississippi. 4
The Court in Caldwell vacated a jury-imposed death sentence be-
cause the prosecutor told the jury in closing argument that the
ultimate responsibility for determining the appropriateness of the
sentence rested with the appellate court, and not with the jury. The
prosecutor's statement was an inaccurate statement of Mississippi
law: it also diminished the jury's sense of sentencing responsibility. 5
The justices in Caldwell identified two related constitutional
evils: giving the jury misinformation about its role and giving the
jury information that, even if accurate, diminished its sense of
responsibility." Some lower courts applying Caldwell have focused
on the misinformation dimension of Caldwell; 7 others have empha-
sized the critical task of maintaining a jury's sense of responsibility. 8
dation to a death sentence. The judge is authorized, at her discretion, to reduce a recommen-
dation of death to a life sentence. Such an occurrence is rare, however. E.g., Ward v,
Commonwealth, 695 S.W.2d 404, 408 (Ky. 1985) (Leibson, J., concurring) NI a jury so
recommends Ideathl, almost. without exception the trial judge has followed the jury's rec-
ommendation by imposing the death pen:thy."). Although the Ohio Supreme Court has
consistently refused to recognize the constitutional implications in its statutory provisions,
the Kentucky Supreme Court has reversed a death sentence where the prosecutor and trial
judge emphasized that the jury sentence was only a "recommendation." Compare State v.
Steffen, 31 Ohio St. 3d 111, 509 N.E,2d 383 (1987), cert. denied. 108 S. Ct. 1089 (1988) and
State v. Rogers, 28 Ohio St. 3d 427, 504 N.E.2if 52 (1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 358 (1987)
and State v. Williams, '23 Ohio St. 3d 16. 490 N,E.2d 906 (1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 923
(1987) with Ward v. Commonwealth, 695 S.W.2d at 408. The concerns raised by these statutes
are analogous and relevant to those implicated under the Alabama, Florida, and Indiana
override provisions discussed in this article. See Steffen v. Ohio, 108 S. Ct. 1089 (1988)
(Brennan, Marshall, & Blackmun, J J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
472 U.S. 320 (1985).
5 Id. at 328-30, 341.
"Id. at 332-33. See also Darden v. Wainwright, 106 S. Ct.. 2464, 2473 n.I5 (1986)
(interpreting Caldwell to prohibit those comments "that mislead the jury as to its role in the
sentencing process in a way that allows the jury to feel less responsible than it should for the
sentencing decision").
E.g., Mann v. Dugger, 844 F.2d 1446, 1449 (11th Cir. 1988) (en bane), petition for cert.
filed, 57 U.S.L.W. 3007 (U.S. June 19, 1988) (No. 87-2073); Haricli v. Dugger, 844 F.2d 1164,
1473 (11th Cir. 1988) (en bane); Adams v. Wainwright, 804 F.2d 1526, 1532-33 (11th Cir.
1986), modified sub nom. on other grounds, Adams v. Dugger, 816 F.2d 1493 (11th Cir. 1987),
cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1106 (1988); Combs v. State, 525 So. 211 853, 856-57 (Ha. 1988);
Grossman v. State, 525 So. '2d 833, 839 (Fla. 1988); Foster v. State, 518 So. 2d 901, 901-02
(Fla. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct.. 2914 (1988).
"E.g., Kurdenbrock v. Commonwealth, 700 S.W.2d 384, 391 (Ky. 1985) ("The impor-
tance of Caldwell v. Mississippi is that it makes clear that what is critical is telling the jury that
rI
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I will focus on the diminution of responsibility component of Cald-
well.
Under the trifurcated systems of Florida, Alabama, and Indi-
ana, even a descriptively accurate statement regarding the specific
roles of the judge and jury would suggest that each bears, at most,
only partial responsibility for the sentence. As a result, both judge
and jury could look to the other as the decisionmaker responsible
for making the hard choices — with neither ever doing so. When
responsibility for a death sentence is divided, there exists the danger
— identified in Caldwell as constitutionally intolerable — that no one
bears the ultimate responsibility for this critical decision.
II. THE JURY OVERRIDE STATUTES
Jury override statutes are a recent phenomenon. In Florida,
for example, juries sentenced in capital cases for the century
prior to the Supreme Court's 1972 decision in Furman v. Georgia, 9
which invalidated all capital statutes in the United States as
then administered.t° The jury override procedure was
its sentence is only a recommendation, without regard to the argument over whether the
word 'recommendation' is technically correct.").
9 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
10 In 1822, when Florida became a Territory, Florida enacted its first criminal code. The
First Legislative Council of Florida, meeting in Pensacola, passed "An Act for the Appre-
hension of' Criminals, and the Punishment of Crimes and Misdemeanors." See Session Laws,
Act of Sept. 17, 1822. This act, which provided for the first sanctioned death penalty under
Florida's territorial or state authority, designated three offenses as capital: murder, rape, and
arson. The act used mandatory language, specifying that any person committing the specified
offenses "shall suffer death." Id. § 21. Sixteen years later, the legislature added twelve crimes
to the list of capital offenses; this act, apparently for the first time, distinguished between
crimes committed by white citizens and crimes committed by Black slaves or freed people.
Death was made mandatory upon conviction of seven of these twelve offenses; the other five
were punishable, at the court's discretion, by death, whipping, branding, or maiming. See
Session Laws, Act of Nov. 21, 1838, §§ 38, 34, 56, 35, 36, 39, 23, 24, 25, 19.
By 1847, all but two capital offenses carried a mandatory penalty of' death. The Manual
or Digest of the Statute Law of the Stale of Florida, a publication that "Digested and Arranged"
the statutes "In Force At The End or the General Assembly of the State, On The Sixth Day
of January, 1847," reported that at that time death "shall" be imposed for murder, rape,
arson, stealing a slave, perjury that causes an innocent life to be taken, conspiracy by a Black
person, assault of a white by a Black person, manslaughter of a white person by a Black
person, and assault of a white woman or child by a Black person. Id. at tit. 1, ch. III, § I, ch.
IV, § I, § 6, ch. V, § 1, tit. 4, ch. I, §§ 2-7. Only two offenses gave the court discretion to
impose a sentence of less than death. Id. at tit. 4, ch. I, §§ 8, 9.
The 1847 Digest also records the beginnings of the trend away from mandatory sen-
tencing. The legislature had by 1847 given the jury discretion in sentencing for a wide variety
of noncapital offenses: manslaughter, involuntary manslaughter, burglary, larceny, robbery,
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Florida's attempt to comply with the unclear commands of
Furman ) 1
The statutory provisions of the three jury override states are
substantially similar. With the exception of details regarding the
actual sentencing procedures and hearings, the statutes of Alabama
and Indiana are patterned after the Florida legislation) 2
 The
United States Supreme Court, in Spaziano v. Florida,t 3 upheld the
constitutionality of the Florida override provision. Subsequent to
Spaziano, the Court has denied certiorari to challenges to the Ala-
bama and Indiana override provisions." Both states have relied on
Spaziano to uphold the constitutionality of their own override pro-
visions. 15
Since Florida's current capital punishment statute was enacted
in 1972, there have been 526 death sentences imposed in the state) 6
Of these, 113 resulted from judge overrides of jury recommenda-
tions of life sentences. 17 Therefore, the trial judge disregarded the
jury's determination that life imprisonment was the appropriate
punishment for one out of every four Florida defendants sentenced
to death. In Alabama, of ninety-six prisoners currently on death
row, seventeen were sentenced to death following the jury's rec-
and stealing, among many others. See id, at tit. 1, ch. 111, §1 2, 3, 4, ch. IV, §§ 2, 3. In 1872,
the legislature rejected mandatory capital punishment in favor of discretionary death sen-
tencing. W. BOWERS, LEGAL HOMICIDE 10-11 (1984). By 1884 the Florida Supreme Court
was able to state that "Mlle law is positive. If a majority of the jurors recommend to mercy,
by whatever motives they may be actuated (and these motives are not circumscribed) the
court is bound to heed their verdict and pronounce sentence accordingly." Newton v. State,
21 Fla. 53, 101 (1884); see also Garner v. State, 28 Fla. 113, 161, 9 So. 835, 847 (1891),
" Ehrhardt & Levinson, Florida's Legislative Response to Furman: An Exercise in Futility?,
64 J. Calm. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 10, 12-15 (1973); Mello & Robson, Judge Over July Florida's
Practice of Imposing Death Over Life in Capital Cases, 13 FLA. Sr. U.L, REV. 31, 68-70 (1985).
12 Following the Supreme Court's determination that the Florida statute satisfied the
constitutional requirements and concerns of Furman, see Praia v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 251
(1976), both Alabama and Indiana enacted statutes substantially similar to the Florida pro-
visions. Compare ALA. Com: § 13A-5-45 through § 13A-5-53 (1981) and FLA, STAT. § 921.141
(1983) with IND. CODE § 35-50-2-9 (1981). See also Note, The Indiana Death Penalty: An Exercise
in Constitutional Futility, 15 VAL. U.L. REV. 409, 426 (1981),
0 468 U.S. 447 (1984).
" Harrell v. Alabama, 106 S. Ct. 269 (1985); Schiro v. Indiana, 106 S. Ct. 1246 (1986).
' 5 E.g., Ex Parte Harrell, 470 So. 2d 1309, 1317 (Ala. 1985); Bieghler v. State, 481 N.E.2d
78, 94 (Ind. 1985).
L" Letter from Michael Radelet, Ph.D., Associate Professor, University of Florida, to
Dennis Balske, Esq. (Mar. 7, 1988) [hereinafter Radelet Letter]; see also Radelet, Rejecting the
July: The Imposition of the Death Penalty in Florida, 18 U.C. Davis L. REV. 1409 (1985).
Radelet Letter, supra note 16.
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ommendation of life imprisonment.'s In Indiana, trial courts have
overridden jury's life recommendations on three occasions.°
A. The Statutes
Upon conviction of a capital felony, a separate sentencing pro-
ceeding is conducted to determine whether the defendant should
be sentenced to life imprisonment or death. 2° During this primary
sentencing phase, evidence is presented to the jury to show the
existence or nonexistence of aggravating and mitigating circum-
stances. The jury considers all evidence introduced at the trial, as
well as any additional evidence or testimony relevant to the sen-
tencing determination. 2 ' After all of the sentencing evidence is pre-
sented, the jury makes an "advisory" 22 sentence or "recommenda-
tion." 25
In order to recommend a sentence of death, the jury must find
the existence of at least one aggravating circumstance, and conclude
that any mitigating circumstances are outweighed by the aggravat-
ing circumstances. 24 Indiana and Florida require that aggravating
circumstances be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, whereas Ala-
bama only requires findings that such factors exist. The jury is not
required to issue findings on the circumstances considered.
In all three jury override states, after the jury has returned its
advisory sentence, the judge completes the final phase of the sen-
tencing procedure by making the ultimate sentencing determina-
tion. The judge is required to make her own findings as to aggra-
vating and mitigating circumstances, independently of the jury's
deliberations. 25 In deciding upon the sentence, the statutes in Ala-
bama and Indiana require the judge to consider the jury's advisory
18 Letter from Eva Ansley, Alabama Capital Case Resource Center, to Michael Mello
(May 26, 1988). There are two additional Alabama cases, no longer under an active death
sentence, where death sentences were imposed after a jury recommendation of life-without-
parole. Arthur Jones was executed on March 21, 1986. Jones v. State, 456 So, 2d 366 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1983), aff'd, Ex Parte Jones, 456 So. 2c1 380 (Ala. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S.
1062 (1985). Coy Patrick Crowe was resentenced to life imprisonment in November 1986.
Crowe v. State, 485 So. 2d 351 (Ala. Crim. App. 1985), rev'd, Ex Parte Crowe, 485 So. 2d
373 (Ala.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3284 (1986).
' 2 Letter from Eva Ansley, supra note 18.
2" FLA. STAT. § 921.141(1); ALA. STAT. §§ 13A-5-45, 13A-5.46; IND. STAT. § 35-50-2-9(d).
21
 FLA. STAT. § 921.141(1); ALA. CODE § 13A-5-45(c); IND. Cons § 35-50-2-9(d).
22 FLA. STAT. § 921.141(2); ALA. CODE § 13A-5-46(e).
23 IND. CODE § 35-50-2-9(e)(2).
24
 Id. § 35-50-2.9(e); FLA. STAT. § 921.141(2); ALA. Cons § 1 3A-5-4 6(e)(3).
25 FLA. STAT. § 921.141(3); ALA. CODE §§ I3A-5-47, 48: IND. CODE '§ 35-50-2-9(e).
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sentence. 26 The Florida statute contains no such express provision
for consideration of the jury's recommendation, but the Florida
Supreme Court has held that the jury's recommendation is to be
accorded great deference.27 In all three states, nonetheless, the
statutes are clear as to the nonbinding nature of the jury's recom-
mendation. 28 In each case where the judge imposes a death sen-
tence, the court must enter written findings of fact concerning the
aggravating and mitigating circumstances. 29
B. Appellate Review (grimy Overrides
In all three jury overrides states, the capital sentencing statutes
expressly provide for automatic review of death sentences. In Flor-
ida and Indiana, the judgment of conviction and sentence of death
is subject to review by the state's supreme court." In Alabama, the
condemned person is entitled to review by the Alabama Court of
Criminal Appeals, subject to discretionary review by the Alabama
Supreme Court. 3 '
Alabama and 'Indiana have adopted similar standards for re-
view of the judge-imposed death sentence, regardless of the jury's
advisory sentence. In both states, the guilt or innocence determi-
nation as well as the appropriateness of the death sentences are
reviewed for error. 32 In neither Alabama nor Indiana, however,
does the appellate court review the trial court's jury override sen-
tencing in light of the jury's recommendation. In Indiana the "rules
governing the scope of appellate review of sentences provide that
the appellate court `will not revise a sentence authorized by statute
except where such sentence is manifestly unreasonable,' and a 'sen-
tence is not manifestly unreasonable unless no reasonable person
'26 ALA. CODE § 13A-5-47(e); IND. CODE § 35-50-2-0(e).
Tedder V. State, 322 So. 2d 908, 910 (Ha. 1975); see also Engle v. State, 438 So, 2d
803, 812 (Fla. 1983).
" FLA. STAT. § 921.141(3) ("Notwithstanding the recommendation of a majority of the
jury, the court, after weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, shall enter a
sentence of life imprisonment or death."); ALA. CODE § 3A-5-47(e) ("While the jury's rec-
ommendation concerning sentence shall be given consideration, it is not binding upon the
court."); IND. CODE § 35-50-2-9(e) ("The court is not bound by the jury's recommendation.").
29 FLA. STAT. § 921.141(3); ALA. CODE § 13A-5-47(d); !No. Cone § 35-50-1A-3.
" F1,4. S .c•r. 921.141(4); [No. CODE § 35-50-2-9(h).
ALA. CODE § 13A-5-53.
"See Floyd v. State, 486 So. 2d 1309, 1316 (Ala. CHID. App. 1985), aff'd sub nom. Ex
Parte Floyd, 486 So. 2c1 1321, 1323 (Ala. 1986); Schiro v, State, 451 N.E.2d 1047, 1053 (Ind.),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1003 (1983).
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could find such sentence appropriate .
	 .'"33
 Thus, the focus of
appellate review in those states is on the propriety of the trial judge's
decision, with the jury's recommendation viewed, at best, as a factor
to be "considered." The trial court's findings of aggravating and
mitigating circumstances, along with asserted procedural errors,
provide the basis for appellate review. Indeed, some Alabama and
Indiana cases have rejected the jury recommendation of sentence
as an especially significant factor in appellate review. 34 There have
been no capital sentence reversals on the issue of jury override in
the Alabama appellate courts." Likewise, in Indiana, there have
been no appellate court reversals or remands due to a judge's error
in considering the jury's advisory sentence." Both states upheld the
constitutionality of their jury override provisions after Spaziano. 37
In Florida, by contrast, a death sentence imposed following a
jury's recommendation of life imprisonment will be sustained on
appeal only if the "facts suggesting a sentence of death . [are so]
clear and convincing that virtually no reasonable person could dif-
fer,"" Florida's stringent standard of review has been applied vig-
orously by the Florida Supreme Court. Between two-thirds and
three-fourths of all life overrides reviewed by the court have been
vacated and remanded for imposition of a life sentence, resentenc-
ing, or retria1.39
 Although the scope and realm of appellate review
may be limited, a jury recommendation of life imprisonment re-
mains the single best indicator of the Florida Supreme Court's
reversal of the trial judge's death sentence. 4 °
33 Schiro V. Indiana, 106 S. Ct. 1247, 1248 (1986) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial
of certiorari) (emphasis in original).
54
 Ex Parte Jones, 456 So. 2d 380, 382 (Ala. 1984) ("It appears to this Court, however,
that the United States Supreme Court, in Proffitt and bobber( did not find the Tedder rule to
he a general constitutional requirement under a statutory scheme similar to that of Florida.");
Schiro, 451 N.E.2d at 1058 ("While we agree that a jury plays a very important and necessary
role in our judicial system, we are loath to institute a higher degree of scrutiny in situations
where the trial court and jury disagree about the imposition of the death penalty.").
" Letter from Eva Ansley, Alabama Capital Case Resource Center, to Dennis Balske,
Esq. (Mar. 9, 1988).
" Letter from Monica Foster, Indiana Public Defenders Office, to Michael Mello (May
24, 1988).
" Ex Parte Harrell, 470 So. 2d 1309, 1317 (Ala. 1985); Bieghler v. State, 481 N.E.2d 78,
94 (Ind. 1985).
58
 Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908, 910 (Fla. 1975).
39
 Letter from Michael Radelet to Dennis Balske, Esq. (Mar. 7, 1988); Mello & Robson,
supra•note 11, at 52-55.
40 Radelet & Vandiver, The Florida Supreme Court and Death Penally Appeals, 74 j. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 913, 923 (1983).
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111. CALDWELL V. MISSISSIPPI
Bobby Caldwell was convicted of the shooting death of a gro-
cery store owner during the course of a robbery. In their case for
mitigation during sentencing proceedings, Caldwell's lawyers asked
the jury to show mercy, pointing to Caldwell's youth, character, and
background. Defense counsel stressed the gravity and responsibility
of sentencing a person to death." In reply, the prosecutor sought
to minimize the jury's responsibility for its decision, stating:
I'm in complete disagreement with the approach the de-
fense has taken. . 1 think it's unfair. I think the lawyers
know better. Now, they would have you believe that you're
going to kill this man and they know — they know that
your decision is not the final decision. My God, how unfair
can you be? Your job is reviewable. They know 4. 42
The trial court, over defense objections, allowed the prosecutor's
statements to stand, and explained to the jury that a death penalty
is automatically reviewable. 43
Writing for a majority of the Court," Justice Marshall held that
these court-endorsed prosecutorial statements undermined the
as Defense counsel stated that: "It's going to be your decision.... You are the judges
and you will have to decide his fate. It is an awesome responsibility, 1 know — an awesome
responsibility." 472 U.S. 320, 324 (1985).
42 Id. at 325.
.* Id.
44
 Because Justice,O'Connor wrote a separate concurrence, the Caldwell opinion is, tech-
nically, a plurality opinion. Justice O'Connor's brief concurrence, however, expresses only
her disagreement with the plurality's treatment of California v. Ramos, 4f3 U.S. 992 (1983),
and its suggestion that an accurate and nun-misleading instruction about appellate review
might. be invalid because it would serve no valid state penological interest. Prefacing her
discussion, she clearly stated that she joined "the judgment and the opinion of the Court,
with the exception of Part IV-A. I write separately to express my views about the Court's
discussion of California a. Ramos." 472 U.S. at 341 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis
added). O'Connor fully joined in the fundamental thrust of Marshall's analysis: the conclusion
that "it is constitutionally impermissible to rest a death sentence on a determination made
by a sentencer who has been led to hclicve that the responsibility for determining the
appropriateness of the defendant's death rests elsewhere," Id. at 328-29. Thus, the essential
teachings of the Caldwell opinion represent the majority view of the Court, not merely a
plurality opinion.
Indeed, Justice Rehnquist, dissenting, made frequent references to "the Court's" faulty
analysis, rather than to the opinion of a mere plurality. E.g., id. at 350 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) ("1 therefOre find unconvincing the Court's scramble to identify an independent
Eighth Amendment norm that was violated by the statements here").
When other Justices writing in subsequent opinions have cited Caldwell, they have re-
ferred to it as the view of "this Court." E.g., Steffen v. Ohio, 108 S. CI. 1089, 1090 (1988)
(Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., and Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari);
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eighth amendment's heightened "need for reliability in the deter-
mination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific
case."45
 At issue was the concern that "the sentencing process should
facilitate the responsible and reliable exercise of sentencing discre-
tion."46
 Marshall emphasized that the "qualitative difference of
death from all other punishments requires a correspondingly
greater degree of scrutiny of the capital sentencing determina-
tion."47
 Because the Court could not be certain that the prosecutor's
Darden v. Wainwright, 106 S. Ct. 2464, 2473 n.15, 2476 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
In Steffen, Justice Brennan explained that "this Court laid down a genera] prohibition against
trial comments that minimize a jury's sense of responsibility for a death sentence." 108 S. Ct.
at 1090. Brennan went on to describe the portion of the opinion that was the product of "a
four justiceplurality," not joined by Justice O'Connor. Id. at 1091. With the exception of that
part of Caldwell, the body of the opinion is a majority view.
Perhaps most telling of the fact that Caldwell is perceived, effectively, as a majority
opinion, is the treatment that the case has received by the supreme courts of the several
states that have addressed Caldwell claims. The Supreme Court of Virginia stated that in
Caldwell, "Justice Marshall, writing for a majority of five, found that unreliability and bias
inhere in death sentences following 'state-induced suggestions that the sentencing jury may
shift its stint of responsibility to an appellate court. — Frye v. Commonwealth, 231 Va. 370,
396, 345 S.E.2d 267, 285 (1986). The Frye court noted that "[o]ne section of Justice Marshall's
opinion speaks for only a plurality of the Court, as Justice O'Connor wrote separately to
express her view of the application of California v. Ramos." Id. at 396 n.5, 345 S.E.2c1 at 287
n.5. Similarly, the Supreme Court of Colorado, in People v. Drake, referred to Caldwell as the
decision of "the United States Supreme Court," and held it to be fully controlling. 748 P.2d
1237, 1258-59 (Colo. 1988) (finding reversible error where prosecutor told sentencing jury
that "you have a shared responsibility" because the job of passing on the death penalty is,
ultimately, on the trial court). The New Jersey Supreme Court, in Stale v. Ramseur, finding
error in the trial court's instructions that the jury's sentencing role was "merely to apply the
law," held that as the United States Supreme Court has recently made clear," jury instructions
must never lead capital sentencers to believe that their responsibility is diminished. 106 N.J.
123, 316, 524 A.2d 188, 286 (1987). In fact, in virtually every state supreme court opinion
that has addressed similar Caldwell claims, the Caldwell opinion is referred to as that of "the
Court." See, e.g., Hooks v. State, 502 So. 2d 401, 401 (Ala. Grim. App. 1987); People v.
Milner, 45 Cal. 3d 227, 753 P.2d 669, 246 Cal. Rptr. 713 (1988); Combs v. State, 525 So. 2d
853, 856 (Fla. 1988); People v. Lego, 116 Ill. 2d 323, 350, 507 N.E.2d 800, 810 (1987);
Matthews v. Commonwealth, 709 S.W.2d 414, 421 (Ky. 1985); State v. Clark, 492 So. 2d 862,
871 (La. 1986); Booker v. State, 511 So. 2d 1329, 1332 (Miss. 1987); Mazzan v. State, 733
P.M 850, 851 (Nev. 1987); State v. Buell, 22 Ohio St. 3d 124, 489 N.E.2d 795 (1988);
Commonwealth v. Baker, 511 Pa. I, 21, 511 A.2d 777, 791 (1986); Modden v, State, 721
S.W.2d 859, 862 (Tex Ct. App. 1986); Petition of Jeffries, 110 Wash. 2d 326, 752 P.2d 1338
(1988).
" Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 330 (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305
(1976)); see also, e.g., Mills v. Maryland, 108 S. Ct. 1860. 1870 (1988) ("The decision to exercise
the power of the State to execute a defendant is unlike any other decision citizens and public
officials are called upon to make. Evolving standards of societal decency have imposed a
correspondingly high requirement of reliability on the determination that death is the ap-
propriate penalty in a particular case.").
46 Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 329.
47 Id. (quoting California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 998-99 (1983)).
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statements had no effect on the sentencing decision, the decision
did not meet the standard of reliability required by the eighth
amendment. Although Caldwell's conviction was affirmed, his death
sentence was vacated."
Justice Marshall's opinion identified four reasons to fear "sub-
stantial unreliability" and a bias in favor of death sentences when
there are suggestions that the jury sentencing decision is not final."
First, he noted the limited scope of appellate review of sentencing
decisions. Appellate courts are "wholly ill-suited to evaluate the
appropriateness of death in the first instance" because of the in-
ability of the appellate record to convey the "intangibles" that may
affect a death sentence'" Because "most appellate courts review
sentencing determinations with a presumption of correctness," a
defendant's right to a fair sentencing determination would not be
merely postponed, but deprived altogether.'''
Second, Justice Marshall observed that there was an "intolerable
danger" that a jury, otherwise unconvinced that death is the appro-
priate sentence, might wish to "send a message" of extreme disap-
proval of the defendant's acts. 52 Confident that the decision could
be "corrected on appeal," the jury might more freely impose a
sentence of death.
Third, because only a death sentence is reviewable, a jury's
inclination to "delegate" responsibility would necessitate imposition
of a death sentence. This would present the "specter of the impo-
sition of death based on a factor wholly irrelevant to legitimate
sentencing concerns." 53 The death sentence resulting from the jury's
desire to avoid ultimate responsibility could lead to a defendant's
execution despite a state's failure to prove that death was the ap-
propriate punishment.
" Id. at 341.
4" Id. at 330.
5" Id. Justice Marshall stated:
Whatever intangibles a jury might consider in its sentencing determination, few
can be gleaned from the appellate record. This inability to confront and examine
the individuality of the defendant would be particularly devastating to any
argument fur consideration of what this Court has termed "[those] compassion-
ate or mitigating factors stemming from the diverse frailties of mankind."
Id. (quoting Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304). He stated further, "[w]hen we held that a defendant
has a constitutional right to the consideration of such factors ... we clearly envisioned that
that consideration would occur among sentencers who were present to hear the evidence
arid arguments and see the witnesses." Id. at 330-31.
51 Id .
57 Id. at 331.
"Id. at 332.
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Finally, Marshall acknowledged the extremely difficult position
in which the capital sentencing juror is placed. Faced with the issue
of deciding whether another should die, jurors are given "only
partial guidance" and afforded "substantial discretion."54 "Given
such a situation," Marshall wrote, "the uncorrected suggestion that
the responsibility for any determination of death will rest with
others presents an intolerable danger that the jury will in fact choose
to minimize the importance of the role." 55 This problem is com-
pounded when the jury is made aware that the ultimate arbiters are
the justices of the state's supreme court. It is possible that "many
jurors will be tempted to view these respected legal authorities as
having more of a 'right' to make such an important decision than
has the jury."56 The invitation to rely on judicial review "will gen-
erate a bias toward returning a death sentence that is simply too
great."57
In light of the foregoing reasons, Marshall's opinion observed
that legal authorities have almost unanimously rejected the type of
statements made by the prosecutor in Caldwell. Most state courts
that have dealt with the question have condemned the prejudicial
effect of prosecutorial conduct that minimizes the juror's sense of
responsibility. 58
Marshall addressed and rejected the state's three arguments for
why Caldwell's death sentence should be upheld regardless of the
prosecutor's statements. First, Marshall found no merit to the state's
contention that the prosecutor's comments were "invited" as a "rea-
sonable response" to the defense counsel's arguments. 59 Second,
Marshall reasoned that the Court's decision in Donnelly v. De-
Christoforo6° did not preclude a finding of constitutional error in the
misleading arguments of a prosecutor. 61 Third, Marshall rejected
" Id. at 333.
55 Id.
55 Id.
57 Id,
w Id. at 333-34.
w Id. at 336-37.
60
 416 U.S. 637 (1974). The Dannelly Court examined the prejudicial effect of a prose-
cutor's remark to the jury, in reference to defendant and his counsel: "They said that they
hope that you find him not , guilty. I quite frankly think that they hope that you find him
guilty of something a little less than first-degree murder." Id. at 640. The Court held that
this remark, though ambiguous, stood corrected by the trial court's specific disapproving
instructions. Id. at 644-45. The Court emphasized the distinction between "ordinary trial
error of a prosecutor" and "that sort of egregious misconduct" that would amount to a denial
of constitutional due process. Id. at 647-48.
61 Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 337-40.
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the state's argument that California v. Ramose was authority per-
mining states freely to decide what information about post-sentenc-
ing procedure to expose to a jury. Where the prosecutor's argument
about appellate review is neither accurate nor relevant, the limited,
valid state interest outlined in Ramos is not satisfied.° "That appel-
late review is available to a capital defendant," wrote Marshall, "is
no valid basis for a jury to return such a sentence if otherwise it
might not. It is simply a factor that in itself is wholly irrelevant: to
the determination of the appropriate sentence."q 4 Creating an image
of diminished responsibility is not a valid state interest and is not
sanctioned by Ramos, Marshall concluded.°
Justice O'Connor concurred in Caldwell, joining in the judg-
ment and Marshall's opinion, with the exception of Marshall's brief
treatment of Ramos. O'Connor, who wrote the Court's opinion in
Ramos, agreed With Marshall's statement that Ramos was not con-
trolling irl Caldruell , reasoning that the prosecutor's comments "were
impermissible ti'ecaiTtie they were inaccurate and misleading in a
manner that diminished the jury's sense of responsibility."" O'Con-
nor disagreed with what she perceived as Marshall's. implication. that
any information regarding appellate review would be "wholly irrel-
evant."67 Jurors may not understand the limited scope of appellate
review, argtied O'Connor, and accurate information may be needed
to :educate the jury,ori the importance of their decision." The
COnstitution, she maintained, does not preclude the giving of in-
"2
 463 U.S: 992 (1983). In Rams, the Court upheld the constitutionality of California's
statutory repiirement that capital sentencing juries be instructed about the state governor's
poWer iii,commute a sentence of life imprisonment without parole to a lesser sentence with
the possibility of parole. Id, at 997. The Court determined that the provision served a
legitimate state interest of accurately infOrming jurors of the significance of their sentencing
decision. Id. at 1009.
"3 Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 336.
" 5 Id.
1 i4 Id. at 342 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
"7 Id.
"8 justice O'Connor stated that:
Should a state conclude that the reliability of its sentencing procedure is en-
hanced by accurately instructing the jurors on the sentencing procedure, in-
cluding the existence and limited nature of appellate review, I see nothing in
Ramos to foreclose a policy choice in favor of jury education.... Laypersons
cannot be expected to appreciate without explanation the limited nature of
appellate review, especially in light of the reassuring picture of "automatic"
review evoked by the sentencing court and prosecutor in this case.
472 U.S. at 342, 343 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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structions that include such information.• O'Connor nonetheless
agreed with Marshall's assessment that neither Ramos nor the Con-
stitution permit the type of prosecutorial conduct exhibited in Cald-
well: "I believe the prosecutor's misleading emphasis on appellate
review misinformed the jury concerning the finality of its decision,
thereby creating an unacceptable risk that 'the death penalty [may
have been] meted out arbitrarily or capriciously.'" 70
Justice Rehnquist wrote the dissenting opinion in Caldwell. He
argued that the prosecutor's statements, viewed in the context of
the entire closing argument, adequately stressed the importance of
the jury's sentencing role. 7 ' Further, he disputed Marshall's as-
sumption that a sentencing jury with a reduced sense of responsi-
bility is more likely to vote for the death penalty." Finally, Rehnquist
criticized what he saw as the Court's willingness to find constitutional
error in any departure from "optimum procedure" in a capital
case."
IV. LEGAL DOCTRINE: APPLYING THE DIMINISHED RESPONSIBILITY
DOCTRINAL AND POLICY CONCERNS OF CALDWELL TO THE JURY
OVERRIDE STATUTES
A. Caldwell and Trial Level Judicial Review
The Caldwell Court held that substantial unreliability and bias
in favor of death sentences may result from state-induced sugges-
tions that the capital sentencing jury may shift its sense of respon-
'' Id, at 342 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor, who wrote the opinion in
Ramos, misinterpreted and exaggerated Marshall's treatment of Ramos. Marshall wrote that
a death sentence should never be imposed merely on the basis of the availability of the
appellate review. In that context, Marshall viewed appellate review as a factor "wholly irrel-
evant to the determination of the appropriate sentence." Id. at 336. Although O'Connor
argued that informing a jury of the limited scope of appellate review may be important to
enhance the jury's sense of responsibility, there is nothing in Marshall's opinion to show that
the plurality would not favor such jury instructions if used to increase capital sentencing
reliability.
O'Connor may have been reacting to a misperception that the Court was abandoning
Ramos. Indeed, Marshall favorably referred to O'Connor's language in Ramos that emphasized
the "indispensability of sentencers who `appreciatiel ... the gravity of their choice and .
the moral responsibility reposed in them as sentencers.'" Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 336 (quoting
Ramos, 463 U.S. at 101 I).
7" Id, at 343 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
71 Id. at 349 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
72 Id, at 349-50 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
"472 U.S. at 351 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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sibility to an appellate court. The type of prosecutorial misconduct
and jury instructions condemned in Caldwell — comments about
appellate review — had long been viewed improper by most state
courts as a matter of state law or federal due process requirements. 74
Although the improper remarks in Caldwell referred to appel-
late review, state courts prior to Caldwell had held that any prose-
cutorial or judicial comment that tended to dilute a jury's sense of
responsibility in capital sentencing was erroneous. Comments that
pointed to trial level judicial review, as well as to appellate level
judicial review, were equally proscribed. 75 These cases are in accord
with the broader mandate of Caldwell that "it is constitutionally
impermissible to rest a death sentence on a determination made by
a sentencer who has been led to believe that the responsibility for
determining the appropriateness of the defendant's death rests else-
where."Th The danger of bias and unreliability that may stem from
a diminished sense of sentencing responsibility remains just as great
when a jury is told that the trial judge will review and make the
ultimate sentencing determination.
The Caldwell Court held that, when a jury is told that the
"alternative decisionmakers" are the justices of the state's highest
court, "[i]t is certainly plausible to believe that many jurors will be
tempted to view these respected legal authorities as having more of
a 'right' to make such an important decision than has the jury." 77
Although the specter of the state's supreme court would indeed cut
an impressive and formidable visage to lay jurors, the high court
stands as a distant abstraction. To the capital sentencing juror, the
trial judge is posted as the immediate and tangible legal authority.
She is their judge. As the Caldwell Court noted, the capital sentenc-
ing jury is placed in a difficult and uncomfortable position, facing
an awesome responsibility. Moreover, they are given only partial
guidance as to how their judgment should be exercised. 78
N Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 333-35.
76 Fleming v. State, 240 Ga. 142, 146, 240 S.E.2d 37, 40 (1977) (reversible error where
prosecutor told jury that death sentence would be reviewed by trial judge and by appellate
court); Ward v. Commonwealth, 695 S.W.2d 404, 408 (Ky. 1985) (prosecutor impermissibly
sought to divert jury from responsibility by telling jury that judge has ultimate sentencing
role); State v. Tyner, 273 S.C. 646, 659, 258 S.E.2d 559, 565-66 (1979) (death sentence
invalid where prosecutor argued that trial court would review any recommendation of death);
Lyons v. Commonwealth, 204 Va. 375, 379, 131 S.E.2d 407, 409-10 (1963) (improper for
prosecutor to tell jury that if it errs, trial court can correct mistake).
76 Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 328-29 (emphasis added).
" Id. at 333.
78 Id.
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This guidance is provided by the trial judge, along with sub-
stantial instruction and assistance through each step of the trial
process. To the jurors, the judge becomes, in effect, their judge,
their ally in the legal process. In his recent book Anatomy of a juiy,
Seymour Wishman wrote that "rmlost jurors arrive in a courtroom
with great respect for the judge, whom they see as a fair-minded
father [sic] figure interested only in the implementation of justice." 74
The respect that the jury develops for the trial judge is rein-
forced by the court's control and command over the entire pro-
ceeding. The reference is further underscored by the trappings and
wardrobe of the court. Cloaked in her black robe, 8° the trial, judge
emerges from the recesses of her chambers. All rise as she enters
the courtroom and climbs to her elevated position at the bench.
These images all serve to establish and reinforce the image of the
trial judge as the preeminent legal authority. It is within this context
that the jury , views the trial judge.
The authority and influence of the trial judge over the jury has
long been recognized by the law. Because of this strong influence,
the law has sought to strike a balance between promoting respect
and deference while preventing undue bias and influence. As the
Supreme Court noted nearly a century ago, "it is obvious that under
any system of jury trials the influence of the trial judge on the jury
is necessarily and properly of great weight, and that [her] slightest
word or intimation is received with deference, and may prove con-
trolling."81 Given such strong deference and respect accorded to
the trial judge by the jury, the possibility that the jury may prefer
to pass some of its frightening capital sentencing responsibility onto
the shoulders of the trial judge is very real. As the Ca/dwell Court
recognized, "it is certainly plausible to believe that many jurors will
be tempted to view" the trial judge as having — more of a right' to
make such an important decision than has the jury." 82 The preju-
dicial effects identified in Caldwell, therefore, are equally applicable
to suggestions that lead a jury to believe that the responsibility for
its sentencing decision, whether labeled as a "recommendation" or
otherwise, will rest with the trial court.
79 S. WISHMAN, ANATOMY OF A JURY 146 (1986); see also A. OsBoaN, THE MIND OF THE
JUROR 55, 207 (1937).
" See generally 1 ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMTNALJUSTICE 6-1.3 (1986) ("The trial judge's
appearance and demeanor should reflect the dignity of the judicial office and enhance public
confidence in the administration of justice. The wearing of the judicial robe in the courtroom
will contribute to these goals.").
Starr v. United Stales, 153 U.S. 614, 626 (1894).
82 Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 333.
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When the Caldwell Court laid down its general prohibition
against trial comments that minimize a jury's sense of responsibility
for a death sentence, it identified four ways in which bias in favor
of death could result." Each of these factors is equally salient where
trial .level, rather than appellate level, judicial review is posited to
the penalty jury.
Justice Marshall's Caldwell opinion first reasoned that a jury
composed of lay persons might not understand the limited nature
of appellate review." Marshall wrote of the inability of the appellate
court to hear evidence and to see witnesses and their demeanor;
therefore, appellate courts review sentencing determinations with a
presumption of correctness. Although a trial judge, in contrast, is
present to weigh evidence and evaluate witnesses' credibility, in most
states where the trial judge fixes the actual penalty after considering
the jury's "recommendation," there is in explicit or implicit pre-
sumption of correctness in the jury's determination. In Florida, as
previously noted, where by statute the jury issues only an "advisory"
sentence, the judge may only disregard that sentence where "vir-
tually no reasonable person" could have made the recommended
determination. 85
 Even in the four states whose death penalty statutes
authorize a trial judge to reduce a jury's recommendation of death,86
this action may not be undertaken arbitrarily: The jury's sentencing
determination is presumed to be correct. 87
The second factor identified by Marshall in Caldwell was that a
jury might reach a death verdict even when unconvinced that death
was the appropriate punishment, in order to "send a message" of
extreme disapproval." Given that the trial judge has the power, in
theory if not in practice, to override the jury's death sentence, the
jury may more freely apply that penalty, knowing that the judge
has the wisdom and authority to "correct" the sentence. Whereas
the prospect for appellate review raised in Caldwell remains a distant
recourse in the mind of the hesitant or undecided juror, the trial
83 Id. at 380-33.
B4 See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
as Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908, 910 (F1, 1975).
86 CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.1 through §190.5 (West 1988); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 532.025(1)(b) (Baldwin Supp. 1988); Oruo REV. CODE ANN. § 2929,03 (Baldwin 1986); VA.
CODE ANN. 19.2-264.2 through § 19.2-264.5 (1983 & Supp. 1988),
91 E.g., VA. CODE § 19.264.5 (The court must either impose sentence in accordance with
the verdict fixing punishment at death or "set aside the sentence of death and impose a
sentence of imprisonment for life," The court may only set aside a death sentence after
consideration of a probation officer's report and "upon good cause shown.").
" See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
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judge is present, has heard the evidence, and, it would appear,
could immediately apply the "appropriate" sentence. For this rea-
' son, the second problem posed by Justice Marshall is equally — if
not more — salient where the jury is told that the trial judge is the
ultimate sentencer, with mandated override authority.
Marshall's third assumption was that jurors might correctly
assume that judicial review can reverse a death sentence but not a
life sentence, and may choose to apply death in order to ensure
reviewability. 89 in the three override .states, Florida, Alabama, and
Indiana, the judge has the power to override or reverse recommen-
dations of both life and death. Technically, then, this third factor is
inapplicable to those three states. Functionally, however, override
of death sentences is virtually never practiced. So although judicial
review exists in theory, it rarely interferes with the imposition of
the death sentence. In all other states where the jury's capital sen-
tencing role is termed a "recommendation" and the trial judge is
afforded sentencing discretion, that discretion may duly be exer-
cised to overturn a jury's recommendation of the death penalty. In
those jurisdictions, therefore, the third danger addressed by Mar-
shall is as relevant to the trial judge as it is to appellate review of a
jury's sentence.
Finally, justice Marshall spoke of the danger that jurors, oth-
erwise reluctant to vote for a death sentence, might minimize the
importance of their role where they are told that the alternative
decisionmaker is a state supreme court justice. 9° As previously dis-
cussed, the deference and reliance that the juror feels toward the
trial judge is great, and would create an equally unacceptable risk
that the jurors' sense of responsibility would be diminished.
The Supreme Court, as well as lower courts, have indicated
that Caldwell applies to situations where the trial judge has been
posited to the penalty jury as the final sentencing decisionmaker.
The Supreme Court has summarily vacated death sentences and
remanded those cases for reconsideration in light of Caldwell where
statements were made to the capital sentencing jury that the trial
judge had the responsibility for applying the death penalty. 9 '
' 9 See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
"° See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
"' Rogers v. Ohio, 474 U.S. 1002 (1985) (order summarily granting certiorari and re-
versing and remanding for reconsideration in light of Caldwell in Rogers v. Stale) (comments
to jury that its sentencing determination was "only a recommendation," although technically
an accurate statement of applicable state law, may be misleading); Tucker v. Kemp, 474 U.S.
1001 (1985) (order summarily reversing and remanding for reconsideration in light of
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Federal circuit courts have followed this broad mandate, ad-
dressing a wide range of Caldwell claims. Both the Fifth and Elev-
enth Circuits have found constitutional error in prosecutors' and
judges' comments that the trial judge, not the jury, was responsible
for the "final" sentencing determination . 92 The Tenth Circuit, on
the other hand, has applied Caldwell to cases where the sentencing
jury was told that its role was "part of the greater criminal justice
system," and found no constitutional error in those cases. 93
State courts have also applied Caldwell to cases where the sen-
tencing jury's sense of responsibility may have been reduced in
reliance upon the trial judge's power to review and "correct" a death
sentence. The Supreme Court of Virginia expressly rejected the
Commonwealth's contention that Caldwell only applied to comments
about appellate review."4 Such a narrow interpretation, the court
Caldwell; prosecutor's comments that jury was only "last link" in a process that included police
officers, district attorney, and trial judge).
92 Wheat v. Thigpen, 793 F.2d (121, 628-29 (5th Cir. 1986) (prosecutor's comments that
jury's sentencing decision was not final and would be reviewed by the trial judge and appeals
courts were Impermissible under Caldwell); Mann v. Dugger, 844 F.2d 1446, 1458 (11th Cir.
1988) (en bane) (prosecutor's and trial court's references to jury's advisory sentencing as
mere recommendation violation of eighth amendment) petition for cert. filed, 57 U.S.L.W. 3007
(U.S. June 19, 1988) (No. 87-2073); Adams V. Wainwright, 804 F2d 1526, 1528-33 (11th
Cir. 1986), modified sub nom. on other grounds, Adams v. nugget -, 816 F.2d 1493 (11th Cir.
1987) cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1106 (1988). But see Harich v. Dugger, 844 F.2d 1464, 1472-
75 (11th Cir. 1988) (en bane) (trial court's instructions that it would make the final sentencing
determination did not diminish weight of jury's advisory sentencing role); Julius v. Johnson,
840 F.2d 1533, 1544 (11th Cir. 1988) (prosecutor did not diminish jury's sentencing respon-
sibility by accurately informing it that its advisory sentencing verdict was subject to review
by trial court); Davis v. Kemp, 829 17.2d 1522, 1530 (11th Cir. 1987) (no reversible error
when prosecutor emphasized jury's role as final link in long judicial process); Celestine v.
Butler, 823 F.2d 74, 79 (5th Cir. 1987) (use of word "recommendation," in view of entire
jury instructions, did not diminish jury's sentencing authority); Mulligan v. Kemp, 818 F.2d
746, 748 (1 lib Cir. 1987) (trial court's use of word "recommend" did not diminish jury's
sense of responsibility where jury was also informed that court would be bound by jury's
recommendation); Tucker v. Kemp, 802 F,2d 1293, 1297 (11th Cir. 1986) (en bane) (prose-
cutor's continents that jury was "last link" in process that included police, district attorney,
and trial judge did not render sentencing proceedings fundamentally unfair); Thomas v.
Wainwright, 788 F.2d 684, 689 (11th Cir. 1986) (trial court's instructions that jury had only
an advisory sentencing role not improper); Brooks v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1383, 1410-11 (11 th
Cir. 1985) (en bane) (prosecutor's reference to roles of all participants in judicial process,
although ambiguous, did not 1.1 ndermine jury's responsibility for its sentencing decision).
9' Parks v. Brown, 840 F.2d 1496, 1503-04 (10th Cir. 1987) (prosecutor's continents
regarding jury's sentencing role as part of larger criminal justice system did not minimize
importance of jury's determination); Dutton v. Brown, 812 F.2d 593, 596-97 (10th Cir. 1987)
(no error where prosecutor emphasized tha t jury was part of whole criminal justice system).
94
 Frye v. Commonwealth, 231 Va. 370, 397-98, 345 S.E.2d 267, 284-87 (1986) (prose-
cutor's statements that the responsibility for sentencing is riot jury's, and that "the judge will
be the person that Fixes sentence," constituted reversible error),
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held, "ignored the sweeping language of the [Caldwell] Court, pro-
hibiting any argument which leads a jury to believe that the sen-
tencing responsibility lies 'elsewhere.'" 96 The Colorado Supreme
Court similarly held that any argument that leads the jury to believe
that the responsibility for sentencing is "shared" with the trial court
is grounds for reversal. 96
The state supreme courts and appellate courts of ten other
states — Kentucky, Ohio, Illinois, Missouri, Georgia, California,
Tennessee, Alabama, New Jersey, and Florida — have addressed
Caldwell claims in contexts other than remarks about appellate re-
view.97 Of these, only one jurisdiction, Florida, has held that Caldwell
is inapplicable to its sentencing scheme."
Given the reasoning of the Court in Caldwell, it is not surprising
that no court has held that Caldwell is applicable only to appellate
judicial review. Every court that has addressed Caldwell claims has
98 Id. at 397, 345 S.E.2d at 285.
96 People v. Drake, 748 P.2d 1237, 1258-60 (Colo. 1988).
97 Matthews v. Commonwealth, 709 S.W.2d 414, 421-22 (Ky. 1985) (although brief
reference to jury's decision as a "recommendation" did not require reversal, "court and
prosecutor must be extremely careful to avoid leaving the jury with any impression that
would diminish its 'awesome responsibility in imposing the death sentence"); Holland v.
Commonwealth, 703 S.W.2d 876, 880 (Ky. 1985) (trial court erred when it advised jury that
the judge "can change" the penalty imposed by the jury); State v. Buell, 22 Ohio St. 3d 124,
142-44, 489 N.E.2d 795, 811-13 (1986) (instruction to jury that its determination regarding
death penalty was non-binding on trial court did not diminish jury's sense of responsibility);
People v. Lego, 116 Ill. 2d 323, 348, 507 N.E.2d 800, 810 (1987) (state attorney's brief
suggestion that jury decision was only a recommendation, in light of further admonishments
regarding seriousness of task, did not shift jury's sense of responsibility); State v. Roberts,
709 S.W.2d 857, 869 (Mo, 1986) (prosecutor's statement that jury would make a sentencing
recommendation, although not reversible error, should be avoided hereafter); State v. Hance,
254 Ga. 575, 578, 332 S.E.2d 287, 291 (1985) (comments that jury would not be any more
responsible for death sentence than police officers, grand jury, district attorney, or trial judge
did not tend to diminish jury's sense of responsibility); People v. Milner, 45 Cal. ,3d 227, 753
P.2d 669, 246 Cal. Rptr. 713 (1988) (prosecutor's assurances that jury need not "shoulder
the responsibility" because "the law protects" them in their capital sentencing determination
impermissibly misled jury as to its responsibility in imposing death sentence); Johnson v.
State, No. 83-241-111, 1988 WL 3632 (Term. Crim. App. Jan. 20, 1988) (prosecutor's state-
ments that sentencing jury was "just a part of the process" for determining punishment
impermissibly lessened the jury's sense of its decision making role); Hooks v. State, 502 So.
2d 401, 401 (Ala. Crim. App. 1988) (prosecutor's statements regarding jury's advisory role
were accurate and non-misleading); State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123, 316, 524 A.2d 188, 286-
87 (1987) (trial court's instructions that jury's task was "merely to apply the law" were
prejudicial error); Combs v. State, 525 So. 2d 853, 858 (Fla. 1988) (trial court's instructions
that jury would issue an advisory sentence was accurate statement of Florida law and did not
violate dictates of Caldwell).
98 Combs v. State, 525 So. 2d 853, 858, (Fla. 1988). But cf. Garcia v. State, 492 So. 2d
360, 367 (Fla. 1986) (failure to stress importance of jury role would violate Caldwell).
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rejected its narrow application to appellate review alone. Caldwell's
prohibition against comments that minimize a jury's sense of re-
sponsibility in sentencing capital defendants applies to trial judges
as well as to appellate judges.
B. Caldwell and the Jury Override Statutes
The jury override statutes of Alabama, Florida, and Indiana
divide capital sentencing responsibility. The jury in each of these
states must submit a verdict on the guilt or innocence of the capital
defendant. Then, this same jury must attend the sentencing phase
of the bifurcated proceeding, where evidence of aggravating and
mitigating circumstances is presented. The jury is asked to weigh
this information carefully, to deliberate carefully, and then, finally,
to set its judgment as to whether the defendant has forfeited his
right to live.
At some point in the sentencing proceeding, however, the jury
is provided with an additional piece of information. It is told that
the ultimate sentencing responsibility rests not upon itself, but with
the trial judge. The judge will make the final determination; they
are only to issue a "recommendation" or "advisory" sentence.
Whether this news is provided by the prosecution, by the defense,
or by the court is of no import. The message is clear: Your job is
not to decide whether the defendant will live or die; you are here
only to provide your advice, your opinion, and the court is not
bound by your recommendation. It makes no difference if the jury
is informed that the trial judge must accord its recommendation
"great weight"" or merely give it some unspecified degree of "con-
sideration."'" The jury is left, at best, with the sense that its sen-
tencing decision will not necessarily be followed. At worst, it may
believe that its determination is only pro forma, of little relevance to
the defendant's fate. Faced with its diminished sentencing role, this
jury is prone toward the same death-bias against which the Court
warned in Caldwell.
Marshall's Caldwell opinion stems from the basic notion that
jurors are naturally reluctant to impose a death sentence. This
notion is grounded in a well established body of both legal
" E.g., 'Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908, 910 (Fla. 1975).
1 " 0 E.g., ALA. CODE § 3A-5-47(e) (1982); INTO. CODE § 35-50-2-9(e) (Supp. 1984).
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doctrinem and empirical evidence.w 2 Indeed, the voir dire process
in a capital case is to a large extent devoted to choosing jurors who
are not biased unreasonably toward the objectives of either the state
or the defendant. And although the Supreme Court has approved
the procedure of selecting "death-qualified" jurors,'" a capital sen-
tencing scheme must meet the eighth amendment's need for height-
ened reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate
punishment in a specific case.'" It is the jury's natural reluctance
to invoke the death penalty, the "quality of mercy" that it brings to
the sentencing proceeding, that fosters the reliability required by
the Constitution. 1 °5
Justice Marshall's proscription against statements that lead a
capital sentencer to believe that sentencing responsibility rests else-
where draws from a deep well of established common law doctrine.
'al E.g., State v. White, 286 N.C. 395, 404, 211 S.E.2d 445, 450 (1975) (prosecutor's
argument to jury regarding availability of judicial review of death sentence "was clearly
intended to overcome the jurors' natural reluctance to render a verdict of guilty to murder
in the first degree by diluting their responsibility for its consequences").
102 E.g., Radelet, supra note 16, at 1413 ("The first observation that can be made from
these data is that jurors are less likely to favor the imposition of a death sentence than are
judges."); KALVEN & ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 434-49 (1971).
105 Lockhart v. McCree, 106 S. Ct. 1758, 1764-70 (1986) (process of "death-qualifying"
jurors — identifying and excluding from service venire members with conscientious scruples
against the death penalty — held constitutional). The bitter irony of Florida's jury override
experience is that jurors in that state are among the most death-prone in the country. As
one Florida trial judge stated, "Northern Florida is the last constitutional stronghold of
people conservative about and protective of law enforcement." Interview with Florida Circuit
Judge John Rudd, conducted for Geimer & Amsterdam,. Why Jurors Vote Life or Death:
Operative Factors in Ten Florida Death Penalty Cases, 15 AM. J. CHITI. L. 1, 1 (1988). In such an
environment, where a juror's natural reluctance toward imposing a death sentence may well
be minimal, it is difficult to ignore the bias toward death that might result from a jury's
awareness that its decision is not binding.
Ju' E.g., Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 330 (1985); California v. Ramos, 463 U.S.
992, 998-99 (1983); Heck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 637-38 (1980); Lockett v. Ohio, 438
U.S. 586, 604 (1978); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357-58 (1977); Woodson v. North
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976).
LOS As Justice Marshall wrote in Caldwell, the capital sentencer must consider "those
compassionate or mitigating factors stemming from the diverse frailties of humankind."
Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 330 (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. at 304). Although
Marshall noted that appellate courts were not suited to evaluate the appropriateness of the
death penalty in the first instance, id., data describing the history of jury overrides in Florida
strongly demonstrates that trial judges are far more likely to impose a death sentence than
are juries. A full one-quarter of all death sentences imposed in Florida since the adoption of
its new statute have been the result of judges overriding a jury recommendation of life
imprisonment. In other words, in some one hundred twenty cases, a jury was not willing to
recommend that the defendant be put to death, whereas the trial judge chose to disregard
the jury's sentiment and impose the death penalty. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying
text.
March 1989]	 DIVIDING SENTENCING RESPONSIBILITY	 305
The Caldwell rationale reflects a virtually unanimous response raised
whenever legal authorities have confronted the question of a capital
sentencer's diminished responsibility. 106 The rather sparse account
of state law outlined in Caldwell does not fully convey the breadth
and depth of the doctrinal foundation for the proposition that "it
is constitutionally impermissible to rest a death sentence on a de-
termination made by a sentencer who has been led to believe that
the responsibility for determining the appropriateness of the de-
fendant's death rests elsewhere." 107 Caldwell elevated these concerns
from the realm of common law notions of fairness to the level of
eighth amendment constitutional imperative.
As the Caldwell Court noted, almost every state supreme court
that has addressed the issue has condemned the specter of a dimin-
ished sense of responsibility in capital sentencing" — but, prior to
Caldwell, never as a matter of' eighth amendment law. Although case
law dating back to the late nineteenth century may be cited,m the
body of state law that has emerged in the last several decades
establishes the near consensus. Interestingly, it is within the South-
ern states, where the death penalty has been most enthusiastically
176 See Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 333-34.
'DI M. at 328-29.
lus The Court noted that suites have long recognized the importance of maintaining a
jury's sense of responsibility in non-capital cases as well, albeit not as a matter of eighth
amendment doctrine. Id. at 334. Although the ramifications of diluting a jury's role in -these
contexts is arguably less profound than in the capital setting, the body of state law con-
demning such a result is no less abundant. Regardless of the punishment at stake, the general
prohibition is well established: Actions that Itve the effect of minimizing the jury's task are
intolerable as a matter of law and arc grounds for reversal. e.g., United States v, Fiorito, 300
F.2d 424, 427 (7th Cir, 1962) (trial court's instruction, during narcotics trial, that court of
appeals would review outcome, was prejudicial and required reversal); Blount. v. State, 509
S.W.2d 615, 616 ("1 -ex. Grim. App. 1974) (state law violated by prosecutor's statements during
sentencing phase of robbery trial that jury need not concern itself with granting probation);
People v. Smith, 206 Cal. 235, 239, 273 P. 789, 790 (1929) (instructions during embezzlement
trial were reversible error under state law where jury was told that trial court could reduce
punishment); Hodges v. State, 15 Ga. 117, 122 (1854) (stabbing conviction reversed where
trial court instructed jury that defendant could seek appeal to state supreme court: "Again
we must condemn, as we have had occasion to do heretofore, this remark. If defendants
have the advantage, as intimated by the Court, it is one which they are entitled to under the
law; and it does not relieve either the Court or the jury from the obligation to mete out to
them, not only the full measure of their legal rights, but in cases of doubt, to give to prisoners
the benefit of these doubts. To administer justice in mercy, less than this cannot be done.").
""' State v. Biggerstaff, 17 Mont. 510, 514, 43 P. 709, 711 (1896) ("The language com-
plained of was highly improper and reprehensible, and we think the court should, of its own
motion, have prevented its use, or directed the jury to wholly disregard it."); Monroe V. State,
5 Ga. 85, 139 (1848) ("We think, too, that the remark which fell from the Court, reminding
the jury of the existence of an appellate tribunal, , however well intentioned, was calculated,
nevertheless, to lessen their sense of their own responsibility.").
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embraced, that this doctrinal legacy has been refined. One year
before the United States Supreme Court decided Caldwell, the Mis-
sissippi Supreme Court held:
The role of the juror in a capital murder trial brings with
it an awesome responsibility.... Because of the impor-
tance of the juror's deliberations we must be cautious in
avoiding any actions which tend to reduce the jurors' sense
of responsibility for their decision. They must not be per-
mitted to look down the road for someone else to pass the
buck to. .. jurors faced with the portentous duty of de-
ciding an accused's fate will take comfort in the fact of
review. They may view their role as merely advisory, a view
which can prove fatal to an accused."°
The supreme courts of Florida, Georgia, Kansas, Kentucky,
Louisiana, North Carolina, and South Carolina had all joined in
this view long before the United States Supreme Court addressed
the issue in Caldwell [
 — 
although, again, never as a matter of
110 Wiley v. State, 449 So. 2d 756, 762 (Miss. 1984) (finding reversible error in prosecu-
tor's remarks) (emphasis added). Interestingly, the Mississippi court's decision in Bobby
Caldwell's case, one year earlier, stands as somewhat of an anomaly in that state's death
penalty jurisprudence, That court has consistently held that comments that dilute the capital
sentencer's role are impermissible. E.g., Williams v. State, 445 So. 2d 798, 810-12 (Miss.
1984) (state law required that death sentence be reversed and remanded for new sentencing
hearing where state argued that defendant had "eight stages of appeal" ahead of hint); Hill
v. State, 432 So. 2d 427, 439 (Miss. 1983) (although procedural bar precluded reversal, "Ialny
argument by the state which distorts or minimizes this solemn obligation and responsibility
of the jury is serious error.... [lin a death penalty case a jury should never be given false
comfort that any decision they make will, or can be, corrected"). The Mississippi Supreme
Court's decision in Caldwell's case was, in fact, a 4 to 4 decision. Dissenting Justice Lee
reasoned that
[t]he logic of the rule (prohibiting such comments) is beyond question. Comment
of this nature has the effect of lessening a juror's sense of responsibility for the
fate of the accused. Those jurors who are not convinced that a defendant's life
should be taken may not argue so strongly or hold their position when they are
led to believe that a reviewing court will correct a mistake in their judgment.
Caldwell v. State, 443 So. 2d 806, 816 (Miss. 1983) (Lee, J., dissenting, joined by Patterson,
C.J., Prather J., and Robertson, J.).
"I E.g., Pait v. State, 112 So. 2d 380, 383-86 (Fla. 1959) (prosecutor's comments to jury
that defendant's death sentence would be subject to appeal by state supreme court violated
state law and required reversal); Fleming v. State, 240 Ga. 142, 146, 240 S.E.2d 37.40 (1977)
(death sentence reversed where prosecutor, contrary to state law, told jury that penalty would
be reviewed by trial judge and state supreme court); Prevatte v. State, 233 Ga. 929, 931, 214
S.E.2d 365, 367 (1975) (prosecutor's remarks to judge, in jury's presence, that trial court
could reduce death sentence had "inevitable effect" of encouraging jury to "attach diminished
consequences to their verdict, and take less than full responsibility for their awesome task
..."); State v. Henderson, 226 Kan. 726, 737, 603 P.2d 613, 622 (1979) (district attorney's
remarks that homicide conviction could be reversed upon appeal amounted to reversible
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eighth amendment doctrine. The fact that a comment or instruction
was technically accurate has been equally rejected as an exception
to this general prohibition against diminishing the jury's sense of
sentencing responsibility. " As a matter of state law, any action that
might diminish the jury's sense of responsibility in capital sentencing
was firmly proscribed.
Nor has the common law on this issue been limited to that of
Southern states composing the death belt. The supreme courts of
California, New York, and New Jersey have been among those that
have addressed and set forth similar prohibitions." 3 As New York's
Justice Sears reasoned in People v. Johnson:
The vice of the statements and questions of the District
Attorney lies not primarily in the incorrectness of the
error under state law); Ward v. Commonwealth, 695 S.W.2d 404, 408 (Ky. 1985) (Kentucky
law forbids prosecutor's attempt to diminish jury's sense of responsibility by describing jury's
death sentence as "only a recommendation"); Ice v. Commonwealth, 667 S.W.2d 671, 676
(Ky. 1984) (prosecutor's references to jury's sentencing decision as recommendation imper-
missible under law of commonwealth); State v. Willie, 410 So. 2d 1019, 1034 (La. 1982)
(prosecutor's argument that jury's decision was not final lessened its "awesome responsibility"
and required reversal under state law); State v. Berry, 391 So. 2d 406, 420 (La. 1980)
(Calogero, J., dissenting) ("ItThe overwhelming consensus of cases from other jurisdictions is
to the effect that 'comments by the prosecuting attorney ... to the jury on the power of the
court to suspend sentence ... are calculated to induce the jury to disregard their responsi-
bility, and are improper'") (quoting 75 Am. Juk. 2d § 230, 309); State v. Jones, 296 N.C.
495, 251 S.E.2d 425 (1979) (prosecutor's impermissible references to possibility of appellate
review and commutation required reversal under state law); State v. White, 286 N.C. 395,
211 S.E.2d 445 (1075) (prosecutor's argument regarding judicial review of death sentence
was "clearly intended to overcome the jurors' natural reluctance" by diluting their sense of
responsibility); State v. Tyner, 273 S.C. 646, 658, 258-S.E.2d 559, 565-66 (1979) (death
sentence reversed where prosecutor, disregarding state law, commented that jury's decision
would be reviewed by trial judge and appellate court); Stale v. Gilbert, 273 S.C. 690, 698,
258 S.E.2d 890, 894 (1979) (jury's sense of responsibility was diminished by prosecutor's
argument that trial judge would review death sentence). But see State v. Monroe, 397 So. 2d
1258, 1270 (La. 1981) (reference by prosecutor to appellate review, in light of entire argu-
ment, did not amount to reversible error under Louisiana law); State v. Berry, 391 So. 2d at
418 (prosecutor's brief reference to appellate review did not render proceedings fundamen-
tally unfair).
112 & Ward v. Commonwealth, 695 S.W,2d 404, 407-08 (Ky. 1985) (prosecutor's
COnInient that jury would make "only a rutin -mm(1;160'1" of sentence, although technically
accurate, violated commonwealth's law by impermissibly reducing jury's sense of responsi-
bility).
H3 People v. Morse, 60 Cal. 2d 631, 649, 388 P.2d 33, 44-47, 36 Cal. Rptr. 201, 215,
(1964) (prosecutor's argument that trial judge could reduce death sentence tends to reduce
jury's sense of responsibility in imposing the death penalty); People v. Johnson, 284 N.Y.
182, 188, 30 N.E.2d 465, 467 (1940) (arguments emphasizing defendant's right to appeal
constituted reversible error); State v. Mount, 30 N.J. 195, 212, 152 A.2d 343, 351 (1959)
(reversible error in trial court's instructions to venireperson that appellate review would
follow death sentence).
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statement that an appeal .. is compulsory but in the
suggestion that the jury's verdict, if•gainst the defendant,
cannot be seriously harmful to him because of the oppor-
tunity for review. . . Nothing can be permitted to weaken
the jurors' sense of obligation in the performance of their
duties.'"
The fact that the remainder of jurisdictions have not addressed this
issue indicates that such statements and instructions are viewed as
fundamentally improper. It seems that few judges or prosecutors
would be willing to risk reversal over so blatant an indiscretion.
It is well established common law doctrine, therefore, that cap-
ital juries must maintain a strong sense of responsibility toward
their sentencing decisions. This is' the case regardless of whether a
jury is imputed with the task of actually fixing the sentence or of
making a "mere" recommendation to the court. The Supreme Court
in Caldwell recognized for the first time the eighth amendment
dimensions of these concerns.
The Caldwell Court rested its holding on the eighth amend-
ment: "[Title qualitative difference of death from all other punish-
ments requires a correspondingly greater degree of scrutiny of the
capital sentencing cletermination."" 5 Because death is different,
there is a heightened need for reliability whenever a state seeks to
take a defendant's life. The sentencing process, accordingly, must
"facilitate the responsible and reliable exercise of sentencing discre-
tion."" 6
The divided sentencing responsibility imposed by the override
states is inimical to this requirement. Florida and Alabama have
both defended their sentencing provisions against Caldwell-based
attacks on the premise that the judge, and not the jury, is the actual
capital sentencer." 7 Accurate information regarding this fact, it is
argued, neither misleads nor diminishes the jury's sense of respon-
"-VoIttison, 284 N.Y. at 188, 30 N.E.2d at 467 (emphasis added).
115 California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 998-99 (1983); see also Mills v. Maryland, 108 S.
Ct. 1860, 1866-67 (1988); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110-12 (198'2); Lockett v.
Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 602-05 (1978); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357-58 (1977);
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976).
11 " Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 329.
" 7 E.g., Combs v. State, 525 So. 2d 853, 858 (Ha. 1988) (trial court's instructions that
jury could issue an advisory sentence was accurate statement of Florida law and did not
violate dictates of Caldwell); Pope v. Wainwright, 496 So. 2d 798, 805 (Fla. 1986) (trial judge
may explain to ihe ,jury its advisory role "as long as the significance or [the jury's' recom-
mendation is adequately stressed"); Hooks v. State, 502 So. 2d 401, 401 (Ala. Grim. App.
1988) (statements regarding jury's advisory role were accurate and non-misleading).
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sibility. The judge is not bound by the jury's recommendation and
carries the ultimate burden of determining the appropriate sen-
tence. Proponents point to the language of the statutes, which re-
quire the trial judge to undertake an independent assessment of
any aggravating or mitigating factor before handing down a sen-
tence." 8
This reasoning, appealing as it must be to pragmatists who are
loath to risk reversal of the hundreds of death sentences that have
been imposed under these statutes, is as flawed as the statutes it
defends. Although the trial judge is not, technically, bound by the
jury's recommendation or "advisory" sentence, she is certainly, if
immeasurably, affected by it. A closer look at the policies and pro-
visions of each of the three statutes reveals the consideration and
deference that is given to the jury's advisory sentence by the trial
court.
Florida's statutory language gives little clue of the true nature
of its juries' sentencing role. "Notwithstanding the recommendation
of the jury," the statute says, the judge "shall enter a sentence of
life imprisonment or death." 119 Under the override standard
adopted by the Florida Supreme Court in Tedder v. State in 1975,
however, a trial judge is normally required to follow the jury's
recommendation:' 29 "The facts suggesting a sentence of death
should be so clear and convincing that virtually no reasonable per-
son could differ." 21 The Florida Supreme Court has scrupulously
applied the standard in the last fourteen years, acknowledging that
the jury's recommendation represents the judgment of the com-
munity as to whether death is the appropriate punishment in a
given case. Accordingly, it is entitled to great weight, and will not
" E.g., ALA. Cone § 13A-5-47(e) ("In deciding upon the sentence, the trial court shall
determine whether the aggravating circumstances it finds to exist outweigh the mitigating
circumstances it finds to exist ...."); FLA. STAT. 921.141(3) ("Notwithstanding the recom-
mendation of a majority of the jury, the court, after weighing the aggravating and mitigating
circumstances, shall enter a sentence of life imprisonment or death ...."); IND. CODE § 35-
50-2-9(e) ("The court shall make the final determination of the sentence, after considering
the jury's recommendation, and the sentence shall be based upon the same standards that
the jury was required to consider. The court is not bound by the jury's recommendation.").
lig FLA. STA. § 921.141(3).
l'a Although Tedder requires a judge to give great deference to a jury's recommendation
of a life sentence, the Florida Supreme Court subsequently held that the same standard
extends to a jury's recominendation of death, as well. E.g., Smith v. State, 515 So. 2c1 182
(Fla. 1987); LeDuc v. State, 365 So. 2d '149, 151 (Fla. 1978) (jury's sentence of death "should
not be disturbed if all relevant data was considered, unless there appears strong reasons [sic]
to believe that reasonable persons could not agree with the recommendation").
121 Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908, 910 (Fla. 1975).
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be disturbed unless it is manifestly unreasonable — which it rarely
is. 122
 Under the Florida Supreme Court's mandate, the recommen-
dation of the capital sentencing jury exercises substantial influence
upon the trial judge. It is chimerical to suppose that, under this
regime, the jury's recommendation is "merely" advisory.'"
The United States Supreme Court, in holding the Florida stat-
ute constitutional, expressly endorsed the Tedder standard.'" The
Eleventh Circuit has also recognized the significance of this standard
and the substantive sentencing role accorded to the jury.' 25 The
court noted that "it would seem that the Supreme Court of Florida
has recognized that a jury recommendation of death has a sui generis
impact on the trial judge, an impact so powerful as to nullify the
general presumption that a trial judge is capable of putting aside
error. " 126
The force that this recommendation exerts upon the trial judge
is sufficient to raise doubts about the reliability of a death sentence
that is born of the divided sentencing roles imposed by the override
122 E.g., DuBoise v. State, 520 So. 2d 260, 266 (Fla. 1988); Wasko v. State, 505 So. 2d
1314, 1318 (Fla. 1987); Garcia v. State, 492 So. 2d 360, 367 (Fla. 1986); Huddleston v. State,
475 So. 2d 204, 206 (Fla. 1985); Lusk v. State, 446 So. 2c1 1038, 1043 (Fla. 1984); Richardson
v. State, 437 So. 2d 1091, 1095 (Fla. 1983); McCampbel! v. State, 421 So. 2d 1072, 1075 (Fla.
1982); Jacobs v. State, 396 So. 2d 713, 717-18 (Fla. 1981); Ross v. State, 386 So. 2d 1191,
1197 (Fla. 1980); Stone v. State, 378 So. 2d 765, 772 (Fla. 1979); Shue v. State, 366 So. 2d
387, 390 (Fla. 1978); Burch v. State, 343 So. 2d 831, 834 (Ha. 1977); Provence v. State, 337
So. 2d 783, 787 (Fla. 1976). See generally Mello & Robson, supra note 11, at 38-40.
' 23
 Indeed, the Florida Supreme Court has rejected this notion, in holding: "If the jury's
recommendation, upon which the judge must rely, results from an unconstitutional proce-
dure, then the entire sentencing process necessarily is tainted by that procedure." Riley v.
Wainwright, 517 So. 2d 656, 659 (Fla. 1987); accord Thompson v. Dugger, 515 So. 2d 173
(Fla, 1987). The best description of the way the Florida courts treat jury error is in Mann v.
Dugger, 844 F.2d 1446 (11th Cir. 1988) (en banc) petition for cert. filed, 57 U.S.L.W. 3007
(U.S. June 19, 1988) (No. 87-2073).
124
 Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 461-62, 465 (1984) (although Constitution does
not require capital sentencing by jury, jury input serves as "community voice" in the sen-
tencing process); Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 295 (1977) (Tedder standard affords
defendant "significant" safeguards).
125
 Mann v, Dugger, 844 F.2d 1446, 1454-55 (11th Cir. 1988) (en bane) ("Because the
jury's recommendation is significant in these ways, the concerns voiced in Caldwell are trig-
gered when a Florida sentencing jury is misled into believing that its role is unimportant.
Under such circumstances, a real danger exists that a resulting death sentence will be based
at least in part on the determination of a decisionmaker that has been misled as to the nature
of its responsibility."), petition for cert. filed, 57 U.S.L.W. 3007 (U.S. June 19, 1988) (No. 87-
2073); Adams v. Wainwright, 804 F.2d 1526, 1530 (11th Cir. 1986) ("Clearly, then, the jury's
role in the Florida sentencing process is so crucial that dilution of its sense of responsibility
for its recommended sentence constitutes a violation of Caldwell."), modified sub nom. on other
grounds, Adams v. Dugger, 816 F.2d 1493 (11th Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1106
(1988).
126 Mann, 844 F.2d at 1454.
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statute. Add to this unholy alliance the fact that trial judges are
elected officials, accountable to the general public, and the odds of
a judge overriding a jury's recommendation of death are practically
nil.'" In reality, the number of such death overrides is negligible.
For a single juror to even partially rely upon the prospect of a judge
"correcting" a death sentence is to risk the very dangers of bias in
favor of death against which Caldwell cautioned. There is too real a
possibility that a juror might chose to "send a message" or to dele-
gate ultimate responsibility to the judge that the juror has come to
know and respect throughout the trial. In Florida, where only a
majority of jurors is required for a recommendation of death, the
override provision serves as an invitation to abandon the eighth
amendment's requirement for heightened reliability in the capital
sentencing process. Under Caldwell, such a situation is constitution-
ally intolerable.
The override provisions of Alabama and Indiana were pat-
terned after the Florida statute. 128 In form, they differ little from
their model. One critical difference, however, is that both statutes,
unlike Florida's, expressly require a trial judge to give consideration
to the jury's sentencing recommendation. 129 Given that both states
require that their statutes be interpreted based on their plain Ian-
guage,' 30 the jury's statutory role, on its face, is far from meaning-
less.' 3 '
"7 The Eleventh Circuit acknowledged the effect that political considerations might have
upon a capital sentencing judge: "It would indeed be surprising were the trial judge, who in
Florida is also an electorally accountable official, tint powerfully affected by the result of that
[jury recommendation] process." Id.; see also State v. Roberts, 709 S.W.2d 857, 872 (Mo. 1986)
(Blackman, J., concurring) ("Under the climate presently prevailing a circuit judge would
risk his career if he were to set aside a death verdict rendered by a jury."); Radelet, supra
note 16, at 1414, The saga of Chief Justice Rose Bird and her two colleagues on the California
Supreme Court grimly illustrates this point. The three were targeted by conservative lobbyists
critical of their record on death penalty reversals. Spurred on by the ensuing multi-million
dollar campaign to unseat the justices, California voters denied them reconfirmation in 1986
elections. L.A. Daily J., Nov, 6, 1986, at 1, col. 6; id., Aug. 26, 1986, at 1, col, 6.
As Professor Radelet explains, there is no central data source for tracing cases where a
trial judge sentenced a defendant to life after a jury recant mendation of death. Nevertheless,
Radelet's research indicated that no more than a dozen such overrides occurred as compared
at the time to nearly ninety death sentences following a jury recommendation of' life. Radelet,
supra note 16, at 1454.
129 See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
"9 See supra notes 20-29 and accompanying text.
m" Combs v. Cook, 238 lnd. 392, 397, 151 N.E.2d 144, 147 (1958) (a statute is to be
examined and interpreted as a whole, giving common and ordinary meaning to its words);
Ex Parte Jones, 456 SO. 2c1 380, 382-83 (Ala. 1984); Ex. Parte Madison County, Ala., 406
So. 2d 398, 400 (Ala. 1981).
"I As the Indiana Supreme Court held: "[lit seems unlikely, ... that the legislature
would specifically require the court to consider the jury's recommendation if that consider-
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Despite the obvious statutory provision for the jury's significant
role in capital sentencing, neither Alabama nor Indiana has adopted
a standard for appellate review of jury overrides that resembles
Florida's "reasonable person" Tedder standard.' 32 Yet although Al-
abama and Indiana have rejected such an express standard, they
have also recognized that the jury's advisory sentence is far from
meaningless and is accorded weight by the trial court. The Indiana
Supreme Court, recognizing the Force that a jury's recommendation
exerts on a trial judge, has stated:
Notwithstanding that the sentence determination by the
jury is not binding upon the judge, we do not regard it as
a mere formality having no substantive value. If we did,
error if any, in such regard could not be other than harm-
less. On the contrary, the recommendation of the jury is
a very valuable contribution to the process, in that it comes
from a group representative of the defendant's peers, who
are likely to reflect, collectively, the standards of the com-
munity. 133
Thus, although it- has eschewed an explicit "Tedder" standard, the
Indiana court has planted the seed of its functional equivalent.' 34
The Alabama courts, in comparison, have steadfastly refused
to issue a similar acknowledgment of the effect that an advisory
death sentence must have on the trial judge's ultimate sentencing
decision. 135
 Alabama's statute, however, contains additional, signif-
ation amounted only to a book entry noting the recommendation. This court regards the
practical effect of the jury's recommendation as significant." Williams v. State, No. 985-S-
372, slip op. at 8 (Ind. July 8, 1988).
132 See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
I " Williams v. State, No. 985-S-372, slip op. at 8 (Ind. July 8, 1988) (quoting Brewer v.
State, 417 N.E.2d 889, 909 (Ind.), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1122 (1981)).
134 justice Marshall, dissenting from denial of certiorari in Shiro v. Indiana. criticized
Indiana's refusal to endorse a standard of review that accords a jury's recommendation a
presumption of correctness: "A serious inadequacy in the Indiana capital sentencing proce-
dure dramatically distinguishes it from the [Florida] jury-override procedure that this Court
upheld in Spaziano v. Florida.... In contrast, the State of Indiana has not committed itself
to any comparable safeguard to protect against the arbitrary rejection of a life sentence."
475 U.S. 1036, 1036, 1038 (1986).
I35 E.g., Hooks v. State, 3 Div. 460, slip op. at 62 (Ala. Grim. App. Mar. 10, 1987) ("The
trial judge's and prosecutor's remarks clearly defined the jury's role in the sentencing scheme.
Thus, the jury could not have been confused as to its responsibility in the sentencing process.
The remarks here were a correct statement of the law and did not tend to mislead or
misinform the jury, thus we conclude the remarks were not improper under Caldwell."). But
compare Hooks to cases where errors were made at the penalty phase, before an "advisory"
jury, and were held not harmless, and grounds for reversal of sentence. E.g., Ex Parte
Whisenhant, 482 So. 2d 1247, 1248 (Ala. 1984) (state's improper references to other crimes
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icant provisions that underscore the jury's important capital sen-
tencing role. Following conviction of a capital crime, the punish-
ment phase must be held before a jury unless both parties consent
and receive approval from the court for a hearing before the judge
alone. All relevant factors in mitigation or aggravation are pre-
sented for the jury's consideration. A recommendation of death
must be based on a vote of at least ten jurors. If the jury is unable
to reach a verdict on an advisory sentence, mistrial of the sentencing
hearing may result. 13" These factors all belie the suggestion that the
jury's sentencing role is insignificant. Although a trial judge is not
statutorily bound to follow the jury's recommended sentence, it is
inconceivable that she will not be influenced by the "community's
voice."'" As the United States Supreme Court noted, in Beck v.
Alabama, an Alabama case:
(l]t is manifest that the jury's verdict must have a tendency
to motivate the judge to impose the same sentence that
the jury did. Indeed, according to statistics submitted by
the State's Attorney General, it is fair to infer that the jury
verdict will ordinarily be followed by the judge even
though he must hold a separate hearing ... before he
imposes sentence. 138
allegedly committed by defendant rendered penalty phase unfair and required new sen-
tencing hearing). Alabama's mixed message, then, is one of both minimizing and maintaining
the significance of' the jury's sentencing role.
13" ALA. Cour, § 13A-5-46.
"7 Although the Eleventh Circuit's Mann decision focused on the jury override provisions
of Florida, its analysis of the powerful psychological impact that a jury's advisory sentence
has upon a trial judge holds sway in Alabama and Indiana as well:
In analyzing the role of the sentencing jury, the Supreme Court of Florida has
apparently been influenced by a normative judgment that a jury recommen-
dation of death carries great force in the mind of the trial judge.... We do not
find it surprising that the supreme court would make this kind of normative
judgment. A jury recommendation of death, is, after all, the final stage in an
elaborate process whereby the community expresses its judgment regarding the
appropriateness of the death sentence.
Mann v. llugger, 844 F.2d 1446, 1453-54 (11th Cir. 1988) (en bane), petition for cert. filed, 57
U.S.L.W. 3007 (U.S. June 19, 1988) (No. 87-2073).
08 Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 645 (1980); cf. Baldwin v. Alabama, 472 U.S. 372
(1985). Under Alabama's 1975 sentencing scheme, since repealed, a jury was required, upon
finding a defendant guilty of first-degree murder, to issue a "recommendation" sentence of
death. The Baldwin Court held that this provision was not unconstitutional, because judges
were aware that juries had no opportunity to consider mitigating circumstances and that the
advisory sentence conveyed "nothing more than a verdict of guilty." Baldwin, 472 U.S. at
388. The 1975 statute, unlike its current successor, did not contain language requiring the
judge to "consider" the jury's recommendation.
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The Eleventh Circuit's assessment of the "sui generic impact""°
that a jury's advisory sentence is bound to have on a trial judge
certainly applies, then, to the jury override statutes of Alabama and
Indiana, as well as to Florida's. Further, the specter of politics
surfaces in these two states as well, for it cannot be said that an
elected judge would lightly disregard a jury's sentence of death.' 4 °
Finally, that judges generally follow a jury's recommendation of
death is borne out by the override's history: Death overrides in
Alabama and Indiana are clearly the exception."'
In all three override states, the jury's sentencing role is far
greater than its statutory description would suggest. Even a tech-
nically accurate description of the jury's sentence as a "recommen-
dation" or "advisory sentence" does not convey the true import of
the jury's determination.' 42 The exact quality of consideration that
1" Mann v. Dugger, 844 F.2d at 1454.
"D Alabama Supreme Court Justice Jones, dissenting in Jacobs tr. State, aptly described
the beast when he wrote:
The majority's judicial review "cure-all" obtains even less credence when it is
understood that such guided discretion is placed upon a popularly-elected
official.... [T]o leave sentence reduction in the prerogative of the trial court
is to place undue pressures upon this office. Again, admittedly, a trial judge
must often he the bulwark of the legal system when presented with unpopular
causes and adverse public opinion. This State's recent history, however, reflects
the outcry of unjustified criticism attendant with a trial judge's reduction of a
sentence to life imprisonment without possibility of parole, after a jury has
returned a sentence of death. Clearly, this pressure constituted an undue com-
pulsion on the trial judge to conform the sentence which he imposes with that
previously returned by the jury.
361 So. 2d 640, 650-51 (Ala. 1978) ( Jacobs, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
141 For example, there were eight capital convictions in Montgomery County, Alabama
between January 1, 1986 and August 8, 1988. In seven cases, the judge and jury agreed on
the sentence. In one case, the judge sentenced the defendant to life-without-parole after the
jury recommended death. See Letter from Wendy Parker to Eva Ansley, Aug. 15, 1988.
142 It is impractical to simply not inform the jury of the true nature of its sentencing
role. It is not difficult to imagine the confusion and outrage that might result when a jury
deliberates upon the fate of the defendant, only to learn that the judge may — and has —
completely disregarded its sentencing determination. It is most likely, in any case, that the
average venireperson would be aware of the potential for override, and treat this divided
responsibility as requiring that he or she issue only an advisory decision.
The other alternative, of attempting to fully and accurately inform the jury of the
importance of its recommendation, is bound for failure. Any qualification of the jury's role,
as being "advisory" or a "recommendation," will still engender the possibility of a juror
attaching diminished consequences to his or her sentencing decision. As one Kentucky
Supreme Court justice argued, any use of the word "recommendation" to describe the jury's
sentencing role, although accurate, sends the message that the jury's "awesome responsibility"
is lessened by the fact that their decision is not the final one:
Continuously we are confronted by the fact that these words are used before
the jury to minimize its responsibility in deciding on the death penalty. Some-
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a trial judge accords this determination may vary, but it is certainly
a significant factor that cannot wholly be ignored by the judicial
"ultimate sentencer." The jury, on the other hand, instructed or
reminded that, its role is advisory, may, at best, treat its decision as
not bearing the weight of deciding upon another person's death.
Although the degree that a juror's sense of responsibility is lessened
may likewise vary, one cannot say that it will have "no effect" on
the outcome of the sentencing proceeding. 143
 Under such a capital
sentencing scheme, both judge and jury may take comfort in the
knowledge that neither is ultimately, fully responsible for the fate of
a defendant. The concerns of Caldwell — the danger of a bias
towards death sentence — are implicated here.
V. THE DANGERS OF DIMINISHING THE SENTENCER'S SENSE OF ITS
RESPONSIBILITY: THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
The theory advanced by justice Marshall in Caldwell, and ex-
tended in the above discussion to apply to trial-level judicial review
as well, rests on two separate phenomenological assumptions: (1)
that a reduced sense of responsibility will affect a sentencer's deci-
sion, and (2) that comments about judicial review will in fact tend
to produce such a reduction. These assumptions have a common
sense, intuitive appeal. But the Court in Caldwell did not explore
whether this intuition finds support. in the empirical literature.
The empirical literature is not conclusive. Psychologists and
researchers have conducted hundreds of experiments on jury de-
cisionmaking, but most have implicitly assumed that the experi-
mental jury is the ultimate finder of fact for purposes of the sim-
times we sidestep the problem by saying that the word was not overused, and
sometimes, as in the present case ... we recognize that the prejudice is too
serious to ignore.... While it is true that KRS 532.025(1)(b) provides that the
jury "shall recommend a sentence for the defendant," the fact is that when the
jury votes for the death penalty, ii. is much more than merely a recommendii-
don.. .. If the jury so recommends, almost without exception the trial judge
has followed the jury's recommendation by imposing the death penalty... ,
10Ince and for all, we should gel rid of the unfair prejudice inhering in use of
the word "recommend" to describe the jury's function in setting a penalty.
Ward v. Commonwealth, 695 S.W.2d 404, 408, 409 (Ky. 1985) (Leibson, .1., concurring). The
problem lies, therefore, not with the administration of the override provisions, but with their
fundamental unfairness.
' 43 Caldwell's no effect" test has been subsequently applied by the Court in one other
capital sentence case. Hitchcock v. Hugger, 107 S. Ct. 1821 (1987) (Court rejected state's
harmlessness argument because it could not "confidently conclude" that excluded evidence
"would have had no effect upon the jury's deliberations") (emphasis added).
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ulation. Studies of jury perception, bias, understanding, or
dynamics have not troubled to manipulate the presence or absence
of judicial review. Indirect evidence is more plentiful, but it is
subject to caveats; for instance, experiments that do offer insight
into diminished responsibility often focus on situations like crime
reporting or emergency intervention, which may or may not be
generalizable to capital jury deliberation.
Still, a survey of published research offers persuasive support
for the Caldwell decision and for the corollary notion that the logic
of Caldwell requires invalidation of the jury override statutes. As to
the initial assumption in Caldwell, that a reduced sense of respon-
sibility will affect the sentencer's decision, there are four relevant
areas of research. First, studies have compared decisions made when
consequences would attach. against decisions that had no conse-
quences. 14 These studies can be analogized to a Caldwell situation
— if that case is characterized as one in which the jury reminded
of appellate review is relieved of the consequences of its decision
— and to the situation confronted by penalty phase juries and
judges in the jury override states. These studies offer a strong
inference that consequences affect outcome. Decisionmakers who
know that their decision has consequences may weigh the evidence
differently than they would in a nonconsequences situation, and
thus may reach a different decision.
Second, there are the "unresponsive bystander" studies, exper-
iments demonstrating that a diffusion of responsibility occurs when
several onlookers witness an emergency. 145 This diffusion encour-
ages each bystander to be unresponsive, and spreads the guilt or
blame resulting from nonintervention. Just as an individual decid-
ing how to respond to an emergency will be more likely to leave it
up to someone else to act if responsibility is shared, a juror faced
with a capital sentencing decision may be affected by the knowledge
that a reviewing court will have the ultimate responsibility for the
defendant's life. These studies can be viewed as a subtle version of
the consequences or accountability studies summarized above. Re-
sponsibility for the consequences is not specifically allocated, but it
is assessed by the individual bystander (i.e., juror or judge) at the
moment of decision as a function of the number of other onlookers
present.
"4 See infra notes 150-75 and accompanying text.
75 See infra notes 176-86 and accompanying text.
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Third, there are sentence severity studies, experiments that test
the effects of requiring a decisionmaker to choose between a harsh
and a lenient result, without the option of an intermediate out-
come. 146 These studies indicate that harsher penalties will lengthen
deliberation times, a trend that could be interpreted as a demon-
stration of increased feelings of responsibility and need for certainty
among the jurors. Juries also will decide in favor of the defendant
more frequently if no moderate penalty is available, again suggest-
ing a heightened responsibility effect. There are some contradictory
findings; in particular, sonic studies show that where the crime is
egregious, sentence severity does little to discourage conviction.
These studies do not necessarily take away from the general find-
ings, however; they instead could be interpreted as an exception or
special category.
Fourth, there are rule of decision studies that show that unan-
imous rule juries need more time to reach a verdict than do non-
unanimous juries.' 47 Unanimous rule juries also tend to involve
minority viewpoint jurors more fully and to be more confident in
the correctness of their verdict. These results could be interpreted
as a reflection of the fact that providing each juror with a veto
power over the verdict increases that juror's sense of responsibility
for the outcome. When each juror knows that he or she could have
prevented a unanimous verdict, and thus a decision by the jury, the
consequences bear more heavily on him or her. There are other
explanations for increased deliberation time on unanimous juries,
most obviously the fact that it is more difficult to achieve complete
agreement than to obtain a simple majority, but jury dynamics do
not necessarily account for the whole difference. In a study that
compared the decisions of a jury told that its decisions would be
publicly analyzed by a review board with those of a jury not so
instructed, accountable jurors deliberated longer and were more
confident, of their decisions. Enhanced responsibility apparently
played a key role.
As to the second assumption of Caldwell, that comments about
judicial review actually produce a diminished sense of responsibility,
the empirical evidence is sketchier. One study demonstrated that
comments by bystanders may significantly affect the response of an
unwitting subject to an emergency, but a jury's unique position
makes it unclear whether this finding can be generalized to a court-
"" See infra notes 187-92 and accompanying (ext.
"7 See infra notes . 193-97 and accompanying text.
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room. 148 The accountability and bystander studies are suggestive,
in that verbal instructions were frequently used to establish the
responsibility condition, but again there are perhaps too many dif-
ferences to generalize.
Only a specific study will really answer the question of whether
references to review will induce a jury to delegate responsibility or
otherwise minimize its role. No such study has yet been under-
taken. 149 In light of the studies indicating the potential effects of
reduced responsibility, perhaps strong evidence of a causal link is
unnecessary; the mere possibility that comments on judicial review
could trigger diminished feelings of responsibility may suffice to
render the divided sentencing responsibility statutes unconstitu-
tional.
In this section I examine the research touching on sentencer
responsibility that is outlined above. I discuss the implications of
the Court's holding in Caldwell for the jury override statutes. Al-
though the empirical evidence has shortcomings, I suggest that a
sentencer's sense of responsibility for the consequences of his or
her decision indeed does affect both the decisionmaking process
and the outcome. The following discussion is arranged by type of
experiment: accountability, bystander intervention, sentence sever-
ity, and rule of decision, followed by a section on the impact of
verbal comments. The categories overlap in many ways; for in-
stance, most could logically be seen as different aspects of the ac-
countability question. Nonetheless, each has a slightly different fo-
cus, and each also supplements and bolsters the other areas in
important ways. Therefore, separation in this manner seemed to
make sense.
'" See infra notes 198-207 and accompanying text.
149 The ideal study would compare the decisions of a real jury that had been told of
appellate review with the decisions of a jury that had not received such information. Strict
limitations on jury contacts make it unlikely that such a study will ever be undertaken. The
best alternative would be an experiment using mock jurors and a videotaped trial.
A recent study by William Geimer and Jonathan Amsterdam revealed that some jurors
who sat in actual capital sentencing hearings in Florida were influenced by their awareness
that a recommendation of death could be overridden by the trial judge. In interviews with
several dozen ex jurors On the factors that influenced their sentencing decisions, six jurors
referred to their knowledge of the judge's override powers. Half of these jurors stated that
this knowledge increased their willingness to invoke the death penalty. Although this data
does not represent the results of an exhaustive study (only those jurors who could be located
and were willing to be interviewed were represented), the fact that even three jurors in this
sample group were adversely influenced by their sense of divided responsibility is sufficient
to raise concerns about the reliability of the resulting death sentences. See interview Data
collected for Geimer & Amsterdam, Why Jurors Vote Life or Death: Operative Factors in Ten
Florida Death Penally Cases, 15 Am. j. CRIM. L. 1 (1988).
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A. AccountabilitylNonaccountability
One of the great debates in experimental psychology centers
on the extent to which results achieved in laboratory or classroom
simulations accurately reflect what happens in the real world: Do
experimental subjects really act the same way as persons on the
street faced with the same problem? jury researchers have not been
immune from questions of external •validity, in large part because
of the eminently reasonable observation that a decision to deprive
someone of his or her liberty or life may be especially stressfut.' 5')
To assess external validity, researchers have conducted two types of
experiments designed to demonstrate the effect, if any, of real world
consequences on decisionmaking. One experiment contrasts the
decisions of a real jury with those of mock juries hearing the same
case, and another study contrasts the decisions of mock juries when
accountability for "real" consequences is manipulated. Although the
results have not been uniform, accountability for the consequences
of a decision has been a discernible factor.
1. Mock/Real Comparisons
Two studies have used a comparison of real and mock jury
decisions. The first, completed by Diamond and Zeisel in 1974,' 5 '
had startling results:
Aggregating over 10 different courtroom trials, they
found that only 50 percent of the real juries (whose num-
bers were selected in the usual way through voir dire)
favored guilty, whereas 80 percent of the "challenged"
juries (composed of jurors excused from the real juries
during voir dire), 100 percent of the "English" juries (com-
posed of random selectees from the jury rolls without
further examination), and 90 percent of the presiding
judges (privately) favored guilty. They attributed this sig-
nificant association to the realism of the former's role
' 5° Sonic research has shown that when a jury brings in a guilty verdict, jurors increase
their negative evaluations of the defendant, One study suggested that one reason for this
may be that 'juries fee] a tremendous amount of anxiety in bringing in a guilty verdict, and
thus seek to reduce their anxiety by increasing their negative evaluations of the defendant."
Elwork, Saks & Suggs, The Trial: A Research Review, in THE TRIAL PROCESS 29 (Sales ed.
1973).
tin A Courtroom Experiment on Juror Selection and Decisionmaking, Paper Presented
at the Annual Meeting of the American Psychological Association, New Orleans, 1974, cited
by Davis, Bray & Holt, The Empirical Study of Decision Processes in Juries, in Law, JUSTICE AND
THE INDIVIDUAL IN Socarry 350 (Tapp & Levine eds. 1977).
320	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 	 (Vol. 30:283
(although all juries were otherwise treated as similarly as
practicable by the court), and argued against the influence
of composition per se.' 52
The study contained at least two possible flaws: The real juries in
fact did differ in composition from the others, and there was a lack
of replication among the ten trials. 153 Nevertheless, the study pro-
vides "a measure of support" for the proposition that real juries are
more cautious in reaching guilty verdicts because of their "covering
responsibility."'"
The second study, by Hastie, Penrod, and Pennington, at-
tempted to simulate the conditions of an actual trial as realistically
as possible.'" The experiment was carried out on working days in
Massachusetts court and jury rooms, mock jurors were subjected to
voir dire, and deliberation time was unlimited. Subjects were drawn
from the jury rolls, and thus were far more representative than in
experiments using students as mock jurors. Most of the mock jurors
had served on juries before, and they gave the experiment high
ratings for realism and seriousness.' 56
In contrast to Diamond and Zeisel's findings, mock jury behav-
ior resembled the performance of the real jury in the videotaped
case presented. The most frequently chosen verdict of second de-
gree murder was the same as the actual verdict. Nonetheless, a key
difference appeared:
Experimental jurors were aware that their verdicts would
not affect a real defendant's fate. Although experimental
jurors went so far as to discuss the effects of their verdict
on the defendant and his family, the gravity of their de-
liberations did not match the quality of an actual murder
trial. The clearest sign of this occurred at the end of the
deliberation when a verdict was rendered. Experimental
jurors typically greeted the end of their task with feelings
of relief and pleasure, while a typical postconviction mur-
der juror is a study in dejection and solemnity.' 57
The atmosphere of deliberation was atypical, yet juror involvement
was still very high. The study concluded that, because of the high
1 " Davis, Bray & Holt, supra note 151, at 350.
153 Id.
'S'
I " R. HASTIE, S. I'ENROD & N. PENNING1 ON, INSIDE THE JURY (1983).
I " Id, at 42.
157 Id. at 43.
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level of involvement, the nature of the verdicts reached "would not
necessarily be disturbed" by the lack of real consequences to the
clefendant.' 58 The consistency between the verdicts of the real and
mock juries supports this assertion.
2. Mock Jury Comparisons
Two studies support the conclusion that responsibility indeed
influences decisionmaking, although the impact reported by Dia-
mond and Zeisel was not duplicated. Wilson and Donnerstein (1977)
employed two groups of student jurors, half of whom were told
that they were actually deciding a student discipline case and half
of whom were told that they were part of a hypothetical decision-
making study.' 59 The experimenters also manipulated the defen-
dant's character attractiveness and physical attractiveness to see if
this varied the results between jury groups. 16° In each of three
experiments, the "real consequences" jurors were more likely to
convict than role-players, the reverse of Diamond and Zeisel's out-
come. 16 ' The defendant's character attractiveness had no effect on
the guilt judgments of real consequences subjects, but it did influ-
ence their punishment recommendation. For hypothetical conse-
quences subjects, character attractiveness affected both the deter-
mination of guilt and of punishment. 102 Physical attractiveness had
no apparent effect on either jury group. 1"3
The fact that character attractiveness influenced the hypothet-
ical but not the real consequences jurors on the question of guilt
could reflect the unequal responsibility of the two groups. This
interpretation is supported by findings that the real consequences
11'8 Id. at 43-44.
159 Wilson & Donnerstein, Guilty or Not Guilty? A Look at the "Simulated" fury Paradigm, 7
J. AVPLIED Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 175 (1977).
1""Id. Real consequences jurors were told that the experimenter needed confidential
help in a matter involving a student suspected of having distributed the questions on an
exam. The teacher did not want to decide the matter himself because it was an unusual
situation; instead he would rely ott the judgment of the student's peers, and punish the
student if the judgment was guilty. The jurors were then given a booklet describing the
details of the incident, and were told to "[m]ake your judgments as best you can since your
decision will determine what will happen to the student." Id. at 179. Hypothetical jurors were
told that they were part or an experiment on the student judicial process, and were asked to
make their judgment as if they were members of a real jury. Id.
161 Id. at 181,183,184. Arguably, differing outcomes on leniency effects are unimportant;
facts will always differ, and the increased scrutiny triggered by heightened responsibility will
merely produce a more certain decision on which way the evidence points.
Id. at. 181-82.
' 63 /d. at 183.
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group demonstrated greater recall of the situational evidence of the
case and by "[i]nformal observations by the experimenter [which}
indicated that the real consequences subjects spent more time mak-
ing their decisions than did hypothetical consequences subjects."'"
The experimenters hypothesized that the real consequences subjects
might "weight the evidence differently in terms of importance than
do hypothetical consequences subjects." 165
Real consequences subjects likely knew how a typical juror
should respond and so focused on the situational evidence
and weighted it more heavily than the evidence regarding
the offender's character. This might then result in not
being influenced by the offender's attractiveness, . . . giv-
ing more convictions overall, and recalling more situa-
tional evidence.' 66
If the real consequences reaction was not simply to focus on partic-
ular evidence because a typical juror would focus on it, but to focus
because, like a typical juror, more responsibility accompanied a
decision that would bring certain consequences, it would tend to
bear out the assumption of Caldwell that a jury's impulse to minimize
its role could affect the verdict.
A second study, by Davis, Stasser, Spitzer, and Holt (1976), also
suggests that jury responsibility affects deliberations.' 67 Mock jurors
were told that, after they had deliberated to a verdict, they would
be asked to publicly account for their decision before a panel of
experts. The deliberations of these accountable jurors were com-
pared to the deliberations of mock jurors whose verdicts would not
be reviewed. Both the accountable and nonaccountable juries saw a
videotaped rape trial and then deliberated to a verdict.' 68 Account-
able juries reached slightly fewer guilty verdicts than their nonac-
countable counterparts, but this difference was not great. More
significant was the fact that the accountable juries seemed to have
a more energetic debate, expending more effort in reaching a ver-
dict. They also were generally more confident about their conclu-
sions, and they were more nearly certain, when they did vote to
'" Id. at 187.
1" Id. at 185.
'" Id. at 187.
167 Davis, Stasser, Spitzer & Holt, Changes in Group Members' Decision Preferences During
Discussion: An Illustration With Mock juries, 34 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 1177 (1976),
cited in HOROWITZ & WILLING, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF LAW 217 (1984).
' 68 HOROWITZ & WILLING, supra note 167, at 217.
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convict, that the defendant had committed the crime. The study
hypothesized that this confidence resulted from a greater "interac-
tion investment."'" Again; this would bear out the position of Cald-
well that downplaying the jury's role could undermine the respon-
sible and reliable exercise of sentencing power.
The studies that indicate that responsibility is important are
not uncontradicted, however. Kerr, Nerenz, and Herrick (1979)
concluded that there was no difference in decisionmaking between
"real consequênces" and role-playing jurors."° Their experiment
entailed a student discipline scenario similar to the one utilized by
Wilson and Donnerstein."' One-half of the subjects were told that
their decision would have actual consequences for the student de-
fendant, whereas the other half Were told that the case they were
to decide had actually been tried some time before. Because Kerr,
et al hypothesized that the real consequences jurors in the Wilson
and Donnerstein study might have recommended harsher punish-
ment than their mock counterparts as a result of hostility toward a
cheater who would affect grade' curves, his experiment utilized
students from the University of California at San Diego, who were
told that the student defendant attended the University of Califor-
nia at Davis. Kerr also used several stratagems to enhance the
credibility of the real consequences scenario."'
Real consequences jurors were given a written summary of the
case, were asked to decide guilt or , innocence, to rate their certainty
on a seven point scale, and to recommend a punishment on a seven
109 Id. at 217-18. This: interpretation would track the results obtained with unanimous
rule of decision juries, which also tended to have lengthier debates and to be more certain
of outcomes. "InteraCtion investment" and its effects may be linked to heightened responsi-
bility. See infra notes 193-97 and accompanying text.
'" Kerr, Nerenz & Herrick, Role Playing rind the Study of Jury Behavior, 7 Soc. METHODS
& Ras. 337 (1979).
171 Groups of thirty subjects were told that they were to participate in an experimental
program to test alternatives to the university's system of discipline, in particular, the use of
a student jury to decide a student discipline case. A student previously charged with malicious
destruction of university property had agreed to this form of adjudication. The subjects were
provided with transcripts of a hearing on the case that had taken place earlier, and were
allotted a fixed amount of time to read the transcript. They were then divided into juries of
six to deliberate, again for a lixed amount of time. The real consequence subjects were told
that the case would be decided by a majority of the juries deliberating on the case, and that
if the defendant were found guilty the dean would consider the penalty recommendations.
Id. at 342-43.
12 These included asking if any of the subjects had attended U.C. Davis recently, When
a female confederate stated she had attended' a summer session there, and had read about
the case, she was excused from the experiment. Post-experiment interviews indicated that
this technique was effective in establishing authenticity. Id. at 343-44.
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point scale. After privately marking their predeliberation decisions,
the jurors were then divided into six member juries and left to
deliberate to a unanimous verdict on guilt and on the level of
punishment. Deliberation time on each decision was limited to forty-
five minutes. Mock jurors simply received the witness summary, and
were told to try to place themselves in the roles of the actual jurors
who tried the case.'"
The manipulation was quite successful, in that the perceived
importance of the actual juror's decisions was significantly greater
than that of their mock counterparts. But the results indicated that
this perception made little difference in the outcome between the
two. The verdicts and sentence recommendations were nearly iden-
tical. The only divergence was that real consequences jurors were
more lenient in their postdeliberation sentence recommendations,
which did not affect the final jury decision already made and did
not affect the defendant. The experimenters attributed this to "a
desire to be lenient with the defendant when it was safe to do so." 174
The experiment was intended to support the external validity
of jury research results obtained with mock juries, but the experi-
menters noted that the results of this study could not be indiscrim-
inately generalized to actual juries. The experimental six person
juries, for instance, shared responsibility for the defendant's fate;
no single juror was the sole arbiter, and the limits on deliberation
time were unrealistic.'" Still, because almost no differences in de-
cisions were observed, the results raise questions about the effects
of diminished responsibility. In a serious situation where participant
involvement is high, even substantial differences in responsibility
may have little effect on outcome. Kerr, et al's results would support
this point of view.
Where the situation is a high stress one, however, like a capital
sentencing decision, this experimental jury data gathered under
distinctly different conditions of reality and gravity may be inappl-
icable. If this were so, the theory of Caldwell — and its implications
for the jury override statutes — would remain intact.
B. Bystander Intervention
Experiments focusing on willingness to intervene under vary-
ing circumstances offer several insights into the intersection of re-
173 Id. at 344-45.
174 Id. at 350-51.
175 Id. at 351.
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duced responsibility and decisionmaking. In several well-known
studies, Latane. and Darley investigated the relation between by-
stander responsibility and willingness to intervene. The studies in-
volved controlled "emergencies," posing various levels of danger to
the victim and the bystander.' 7"
In each situation studied,• the experimenters found that by-
standers were less likely to intervene if other bystanders were also
present. They concluded that:
If only one bystander is present at an emergency, he car-
ries all of the responsibility for dealing with it; he will feel
all of the guilt from not acting; he will bear all of the
blame that accrues for nonintervention. if others are pres-
ent, the onus of responsibility is diffused, and the finger
of blame points less directly at any one person. The in-
dividual may be more likely to resolve his conflict between
intervening and nonintervening in favor of the latter al-
ternative . . . .
Finally, if others are known to be present but their
behavior cannot be closely observed, any one bystander
may assume that one of the other observers is already
taking action to end the emergency. If so, his own inter-
vention would only be redundant — perhaps harmfully
or confusingly so. Thus, given the presence of other on-
lookers whose behavior cannot be observed, any given
bystander can rationalize his own inaction by convincing
himself that "somebody else must be doing something." 177
"6 B. LATANE & J. °ARLEY, THE UNRESPONSIVE BYSTANDER (1908). For example, one
experiment staged an unexpected epileptic seizure:
A college student arrived in the laboratory and was ushered into an individual
room from which a communication system would enable him to tzlk to the
other participants. It was explained to him that he was to take part in a discussion
about personal problems associated with college life and that the discussion
would be held over the intercom system, rather than face-to-face, in order to
avoid embarrassment by preserving the anonymity of the subjects. During the
course of the discussion, one of the other subjects underwent what appeared to
be a very serious nervous seizure similar to epilepsy. During the fit it was
impossible for the subject to talk to the other discussants or to find out what, if
anything, they were doing about the emergency ....
The number of bystanders that the subject perceived to be present had a
major effect on the likelihood with which he would report the emergency....
Eighty-five percent of the subjects who thought they alone knew of the victim's
plight reported the seizure before the victim was cut off, while only 31 percent
of those who thought four other bystanders were present did so.
Id. at 94, 97.
r" Id. at 90-91.
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Other experiments reached results similar to those of Latane
and Darley. A 1970 study supported the hypothesis that a person
who is made to feel responsible for another will be most likely to
act to help.' 78 Subjects who were told that they were participating
in an experiment on the effects of punishment on learning were
far more likely to cease administering electric shocks to the "learner"
when they were made fully responsible for the learner's well-
being. 179 Shaffer, Rogel, and Hendrick (1975) tested increased re-
sponsibility by arranging a theft in a library under various condi-
tions.' 8° The results were as predicted. Of the subjects who were
asked to guard the victim's property, 77% intervened (or said they
would intervene) at the time of the theft. But only 48% of those
who received no request for assistance actually would have inter-
vened.' 8 ' A second experiment tested the effect of the presence or
absence of an inattentive confederate at the time of the theft. The
experimenters hypothesized that another individual's presence at
the table would diffuse responsibility and reduce the rates of inter-
vention by the subject. This hypothesis also proved to be correct.' 82
The experimenters concluded:
178 Tilker, Socially Responsible Behavior as a Function of Observer Responsibility and Victim
Feedback, 141 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 95 (1970).
ng Id. at 100.
'" The experiment was designed as follows:
The victim seated himself at the table occupied by the subject. After 2-3
minutes of apparent studying, the victim got up and walked away from the
table in the direction of the reference section of the library, leaving behind an
assortment of personal belongings. Before his departure, the victim asked half
the subjects to watch his belongings for 5 minutes while he obtained a reference
(request condition). The remaining half of the subjects were not asked to guard
the victim's personal property (no request condition).
Two minutes after the departure of the victim, the thief appeared and
began. rummaging through the victim's belongings. The thief was careful to
make some noise in order to draw the subject's attention. The thief searched
through all of the victim's books and folders and finally reached into the female
victim's purse (or lifted the book that the male victim had been reading),
discovering approximately $20 in the victim's wallet, (or discovering the male
victim's wristwatch, concealed beneath the open book). At this point, the thief
glanced out of the corner of his eye at the subject, hurriedly placed the money
(or watch) into his pocket, and walked quickly away from the table.
Shaffer, Rogel & Hendrick, Intervention in the Library; The Effect of Increased Responsibility on
Bystanders' Willingness to Prevent a Theft,	 APPLIED Soc. PsvcitoLocv 303,306 (1975). As a
control, a group of subjects who agreed to participate in a study responded to a questionnaire
asking how they would have acted in the situation described. Id. at 307-08.
18 ' Id. at 308.
184 Id. at 315.
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It seems likely that a commitment to the victim's prior
request for assistance represents a simple taking of re-
sponsibility on the part of the bystander, an act that almost
certainly would increase his subsequent costs for not in-
tervening. For example, the bystander's agreement to
watch the victim's belongings entrusts those belongings to
him. A subsequent theft of the entrusted belongings
would likely arouse the bystander's guilt over his failure
to abide by his commitment, and may lead the bystander
to anticipate some form of reprisal from a rather angry
victim who had every reason to expect his assistance...
Since bystanders in the no request conditions were not
offered an opportunity to formally assume responsibility
for the victim's belongings and, hence, were not exposed
to the high costs for not helping implied by this commit-
ment, their low rate of intervention is to be anticipated."
The results contain clear implications for the criminal justice
system:
The existence of many actors in the system raises the
potential for increased diffusion of responsibility, wherein,
despite wide discretion to act, no action is taken. Each
decision-making component may decline to take the re-
sponsibility for a decision because it knows that other
components are equally capable of taking action.'"
The result could be precisely what Justice Marshall feared in Cald-
well: a jury recommendation of death despite some doubt, in the
knowledge that the case will be reviewed; judicial affirmation, based
on deference to the jury's decision; a denial of clemency, because
the governor feels that the courts have spoken; execution, because
if it was wrong someone would have done something about it earlier
in the process.' 85
On the other hand, the relevance of bystander intervention to
jury deliberation should not be overstated. First, it is not clear that
these "emergency" situation studies may be generalized to jury cle-
cisionmaking. Not only is the juror not faced with a sudden choice
between action and inaction, he or she is not in a position of indi-
vidual responsibility. As a member of a body, responsibility may
183 Id. at 317-18.
' 84 NI. SAKS & K. HASTIE, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY IN COURT 216 (1978) (emphasis added).
"r' See id.
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already be diffused to the point where the existence of judicial
review is not a significant factor. 186 The accountability studies con-
tradict this possibility to an extent, demonstrating that consequences
affect group decision. Second, the jury as a whole deliberates and
decides what to do. This deliberation may counteract an individual
juror's urge to shift responsibility to another body, simply by instill-
ing a sense of obligation to contribute to the group of which she is
a part.
Furthermore, because the sentencing decision is difficult no
matter what the outcome, this unresponsive bystander-phenomenon
may cut both ways. The "inaction" that the appellate court will
remedy could be the same regardless of whether the decision is to
grant life or to impose death. In states like Mississippi, where only
a death sentence triggers automatic judicial review of the sentence,
this phenomenon does not pose a problem because only one verdict
will leave the jury in a posture of shared responsibility. In a state
like Florida, however, which permits jury override no matter what
the jury's decision, the difficulty remains because the jury can avoid
responsibility either way. If we assume that death is the more dif-
ficult choice to reach, and that without any mention of review a
jury would favor leniency, then adverting to review might imper-
missibly lead more jurors to vote for death than they otherwise
would because they had been told that responsibility would be
shared. On the other hand, if the assumption of preference for life
is untrue, then a jury shift caused by knowledge of review would
be in favor of life imprisonment. Because the choice preference is
unknown, and will likely vary with the facts of the case, the harm
of diffused responsibility remains somewhat uncertain.
Despite these caveats, the general findings of the unresponsive
bystander studies are highly suggestive. The notion that jurors, like
any other individuals faced with a difficult or unpleasant choice,
will be glad to shift their burden to someone else's shoulders appeals
strongly to a conception- of human nature founded on everyday
observation. Even though the consequences of this handwashing of
the defendant cannot be clearly documented or predicted, it is
unlikely that a "better" choice will result given the limited param-
eters of judicial review.
18" An antidote to diffusion of responsibility among the jurors might be a unanimous
rule of decision, which may increase individual responsibility because every juror has an
effective veto.
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C. Sentence Severity
Several studies that have examined the effects of presenting a
decisionmaker with a decision that will have an impact suggest that
harsher consequences heighten decisional caution. This result could
reflect an increase of the decisionmaker's responsibility. For exam-
ple, one study found that a juror's "threshold probability" — the
perceived probability of guilt necessary for the juror to decide in
favor of conviction — rose when capital punishment was the penalty
in a simulated trial, as against the threshold when life imprisonment
was the most severe sentence.I 87 A commentator points out: "It does
. seem reasonable that jurors would demand a higher probability
of guilt where the stakes of making a type I error of convicting the
innocent are greater, although in more severe crimes there may be
a greater desire to obtain a conviction."'" In other words, when
jurors found themselves responsible for severe consequences, they
required a high level of proof. If responsibility was reduced by
reducing the consequences, then less proof was required.
Vidmar (1972) found that simulated jurors who were asked to
read a description of an attempted robbery and consequent killing
of a store owner seldom chose a verdict of not guilty when they
had at least one moderate penalty option.'" On the other hand,
over half the jurors faced with only a severe penalty option did
choose a verdict of not guilty. Similarly, Kaplan and Simon (1972)
observed that jurors given the choice between finding a defendant
guilty of first degree murder and not guilty acquitted far more
often than jurors given four options, including second degree mur-
der and manslaughter. 1 °• Kerr (1978) used similar materials and
got nearly the same results.'"'
I" Peterson, The Juror's Decision, cited in NAGEL & NEU, DECISION THEORY AND THE LEGAL.
PROCESS 208 n.16 (1979).
'"H NAGEL & NEEF, .supra note 187, at 208 n.16. "As one might hypothesize, when the
severity of the penalty is mentioned, the threshold probability for conviction tends to go up
and the likelihood of conviction 'nay thus tend to go down." Id. at 202.
1 N 1 Vidmar, Effects of Decision Alternatives on the Verdicts and Social Perceptions of Simulated
jurors, 221 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 211 (1972).
111° Kaplan & Simon, Latitude and Severity of Sentencing Options, Race of the Victim and
Decisions of Simulated Jurors: Some Issues Arising from the "Algiers Motel" Trial 7 Law & Soc. REV,
87 (1972), cited in M. GREENBERG & R.B. RLIBAGIC, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY Oi"EHE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM 169 (1975).
IN Kerr, Severity of Prescribed Penalty and Mock Juror's Verdicts, 36 J. PERSONALITY & Soc.
Psvcnorooy 1431, (1978), cited in M. GREENBERG & R.13. Ituancx, supra note 190, at 169.
In a thesis study conducted by Krupa (1979), Kerr's findings were further developed.
Sonic students were led to believe that their decisions would have real Co nse-
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Responsibility for a severe penalty affects not only determina-
tions of guilt; it affects length of deliberation as well. Davis, Kerr,
Stasser, Meek, and Holt (.1977) found that concern over sentence
severity and consequences to the victim increased deliberation time.
Juries deliberated longer in cases where the potential sentence was
severe and victim consequences were mild and in cases where the
potential sentence was mild and victim consequences were severe.' 92
The question, then, is whether comments on judicial review
have the same tendency to reduce responsibility as do reduced
penalties. If it is true that reluctance to make an error in convicting
an innocent defendant is high where the consequences are severe,
then reference to judicial review could well affect the decision.
Reference to judicial review implies, as Justice Marshall noted in
Caldwell, that the jury's decision will be reviewed for correctness; it
is as if the possibility of a more moderate decision is introduced.
Instead of an irrevocable choice between life and death, the jury
has an intermediate choice; impose death, but with the understand-
ing that the decision is not final. Rather than being forced to make
the hard decision, the jury has a fall-back option. The defendant is
quences for a real defendant, while others believed the case was simulated.
While "real" jurors were generally more conviction-prone, they turned in less
convictions than simulated jurors when (a) the evidence was weakly incriminat-
ing, and (b) the prescribed punishment was severe, and (c) an external authority,
rather than they, controlled the eventual punishment. Thus, "real" jurors sub-
stantially decreased convictions based on weak evidence when an overly severe
punishment (in this ease, expulsion from school for copying an exam) that they
could not influence would befall the defendant. When evidence was strong,
and/or they would have the power to ameliorate punishment, conviction rate
was unaffected by potential punishment severity.
Kaplan, Cognitive Processes in the Individual furor (unpublished masters thesis, Northern Illinois
Univ. 1979), in J. HOROWITZ & T. WILLING, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE COURTROOM 217 (N.
Kerr & R. Tray eds. 1982) (citing S. Krupa, Effects of Control and Severity of Punishment
Alternatives on Jury Decision-making (1979) (emphasis in original)).
192 Victim Consequences, Sentence Severity, and Decision Processes in Mock Juries, 18 Organiza-
tional Behavior and Human Performance 346, cited in B. SALES, THE TRIAL PROCESS 29 (1981).
Because there is evidence of a leniency shift during deliberation, the fact that deliberation
is shortened by a more moderate decision alternative may work against a defendant as well.
Although this is not a direct effect of reduced responsibility, several studies have documented
the fact that in all but the cases where the evidence against the defendant is strongest, jurors
as individuals are more likely to favor conviction before than after deliberation. E.g., Stasser,
Kerr & Bray, The Social Psychology of Jury Deliberations: Structure, Process, and Product, in
HOROWITZ & WILLING, supra note 191, at 221, 247, and studies cited therein; 1. HoRowrrz
& T. WILLING, Mr. PSYCHOLOGY OF L,kw 214 (1984) and studies cited therein. This trend is
particularly strong when the weight of opinion before deliberation favors acquittal, but it
has been observed also when the majority of jurors favored conviction as they went into the
jury room. Stasser, Kerr and Bray, supra, at 247.
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left with a chance to show the reviewing court that it was all a
mistake. As a result, the jury may impose a more severe penalty
(i.e., death subject to judicial review) than it otherwise would.
D. Rules 'of Decision
Decision rules have several effects. Juries that must reach a
unanimous decision tend to deliberate longer, delving into the evi-
dence more thoroughly; minority viewpoints are seen as more in-
fluential; satisfaction with the decision is higher; and hung juries
are more common)" Hastie, Penrod, and Pennington polled par-
ticipants in their jury study and found that perceptions of the
thoroughness and seriousness of deliberation decreased as the rule
of decision shifted from unanimous to five-sixths to three-fourths. "14
The experimenters felt that this trend comported with the idea of
reduced responsibility. They noted:
The notion is that decision rule affects the seriousness or
gravity with which an individual juror addresses the de-
cisionmaking task. A lessened feeling of seriousness or
gravity produces lowered Motivation to review informa-
tion thoroughly in the case before changing verdict pref-
erences. This results in faster, less considered movement
from initial verdict preferences to the most popular ver-
dict within the jury.' 95
This same reduction in responsibility could also partially ex-
plain why majority rule juries convict more often than unanimous
rule juries. jurors who have doubts about the guilt of the defendant
may resolve them more quickly when it appears that a majority will
make an opposing vote meaningless anyway. Such an interpretation
is not free from dispute, though:
The problem here is that a subjective sense of lowered
responsibility is not clearly associated with majority deci-
sion rules. In fact, on the surface, a juror in a verdict-
rendering majority under a nonunanimous decision rule
is more likely to feel responsibility. Typically fewer jurors
render the verdict, and often they render the verdict in
the face of persistent opposition from an outvoted minor-
ity faction.. .. However, if responsibility is defined as the
1" R. HASTIE, S. PF.NROD & N. PENNINGTON, supra note 155, at 32.
1 " Id. at 77,
"s Id. at 115.
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ability of an outside observer to identify an individual
juror's verdict preference at the end of deliberation, the
unanimous decision produces the greatest sense of indi-
vidual responsibility in that the observer can be certain of
every juror's final vote.... This interpretation would be
consistent with the conclusion that heightened individual
responsibility is associated with slower growth of the larg-
est faction. The problem is that in a typical major felony
case, the jury is polled individually in court after the ver-
dict. is rendered.... Thus even this subtle version of the
diffusion of responsibility account does not apply to actual
trial procedure. 196
If a majority rule of decision does affect jury deliberation by
lessening the motivation of each juror to carefully review the issues,
however, it is arguable that reference to judicial review would have
the same impact. As was noted above, intra-jury effects may not be
generalizable to a situation where responsibility is shifted to a sep-
arate, non-jury entity; but there. is no particular evidence that this
is so. In the Davis and Stasser study, the mock jury that was told
that its decision would be reviewed by a panel of experts deliberated
harder and longer than a mock jury that was not subject to post-
decision scrutiny.t 97
 This suggests that the existence of a non-jury
entity may be just as influential as an intra-jury rule of decision.
Because that study in a sense heightened the responsibility of the
reviewed jury rather than diffused it, however, the outcome might
be attributable to other factors.
E. The Power of Suggestion
Notwithstanding the data on the effects of responsibility on
decisionmaking, one important question remains unanswered: Will
comments to jurors regarding review actually induce them to take
their job less seriously than if no comments had been made? The
studies discussed above touched on this question; for instance, by-
stander studies indicate that responsibility may be diffused by the
presence of others. Perhaps references to review unfairly alerts the
jury to such a presence. The accountability and severity studies
indicate that decisions varied depending on what was going to hap-
pen to the defendant next; perhaps being told that a death penalty
is subject to review and override mitigates the consequences to such
I "6 1(1. at 1 1 6-1 7.
19? See supra notes 167-69 and accompanying text.
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a degree that the decision is affected. The lack of empirical data on
this point leaves a hole in the analysis, and doubts over whether the
results of psychology experiments can validly be generalized to a
capital jury compound the problem.
There is some evidence of the potency of such comments.
Bickman and Rosenbaum devised two experiments designed to test
the felt responsibility theory of Latane and Darley."s Particularly,
they sought to determine whether the verbal behavior of a by-
stander could influence intervention. In the first experiment, a
confederate "attempted to influence subjects to notice an incident
and interpret it as a crime and . . . either encouraged the subjects
to assume responsibility by reporting the crime or discouraged re-
porting."'• The experimenters hypothesized that if encouraging
and discouraging comments instilled a sense of responsibility, they •
would influence reporting in the expected direction.
The incident staged was a shoplifting,'" and the results showed
that, although only 21% of the subjects felt that the confederate
had attempted to influence them, the influence in fact was quite
significant. Of' the subjects who were encouraged to report, 72%
did so, in comparison to only 32% of the discouraged subjects. 201
The experiment demonstrated that "a few encouraging or discour-
aging comments by an unknown witness can strongly affect a by-
stander's willingness to report a criminal incident."202 There was no
indication that self-perceived responsibility varied between encour-
age and discourage conditions. 203
A second experiment "attempted to influence the subject's per-
ception of the event by defining it as not a crime." 204 The experi-
"8 Hickman & Rosenbaum, Crime Reporting as a Function of Bystander Encouragement,
Surveillance, and Credibility. 551 PERSONALTY & Soc. PSYCIIOLOGY 577 (1977).
1 "9 Id. at 578.
In the experiment, an apparent thief wheeled a shopping cart containing a few items
into a checkout line. With the subject in line behind her, the thief unloaded the groceries in
her cart and then, when the subject was deemed to be looking, grabbed a few items From
the checkout display and stuffed them in her purse. A thirty-five year old female confederate
wearing a hat and coat and with a cart full of groceries, who had followed the subject-
 into
the checkout line, would then either encourage or discourage reporting. In the discourage
condition, the confederate would say, "[lit.'s the store's problem. They have security people
here." In the encourage condition, the confederate would say, "We should report it. It's our
responsibility." Id, at 579.
NI Id. at 580.
202 Id. at 581.
m
2°4 Id. at 582. In this experiment, subjects were told dint they were to observe shoppers'
reactions to a store display. Each subject was paired with a confederate who, when a video-
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menters hypothesized that, as compared with their first experiment
"where the confederate expresses the appropriate course of action,
subjects exposed to this interpretation manipulation will be less
likely to define the event as a crime." 205 Once again there was strong
"evidence that the subject's definitions of the situation and their
definitions of the appropriate responses were differentially affected
by the verbal influence manipulations." 206 When encouraged to re-
port, seventy-two percent of the subjects did so, whereas only four-
teen percent reported when told that the incident was not a crime,
and only eight percent did so when discouraged from reporting.
As in the first experiment, the verbal manipulation did not have
any direct effect on subjects' perceptions of responsibility for re-
porting, but "a few verbal comments can suggest the appropriate
course of action, and thus have a strong impact on one's tendency
to report the crime to the proper authorities." 207
Distinctions between the conditions, of the experiment and a
capital case could be drawn, but the study does suggest just how
readily people faced with hard choices and uncertainty will respond
to a suggestion of what action would be appropriate. This will be
especially true when the suggestion comes from representatives of
the state: the prosecutor or the judge. Like the rest of the research
discussed above, it is not dispositive on the question of jury respon-
sibility. But in conjunction with that research, it contributes to an
argument that cumulatively is quite persuasive.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Court in Caldwell reasoned that information diminishing
a capital sentencer's sense of responsibility created dangers that the
Court found constitutionally intolerable. The logic of Caldwell sug-
gests the invalidity of sentencing schemes that divide sentencing
responsibility at the trial level. The Court's Caldwell reasoning, and
the extension of that reasoning to the jury override statutes, finds
support in the empirical literature.
Although the precise degree of consideration that a trial judge
gives to the jury's advisory sentence in the override states may
taped shoplifting incident suddenly appeared on the screen, either interpreted it as a shoplift
or as a non-incident (e.g., "I'm sure she'll pay for it. She probably told the clerk she put it in
her purse."). Id. at 582-83.
405
	 at 582.
2" id. at 583.
497
 Id. at 584.
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remain in the province of metaphysics, there is little doubt that that
sentencing responsibility is, to some extent, divided and shared.
The trial judge,. though not "bound" by this sentence in either of
the three override states, is certainly subject to its influence. Under
these singular sentencing provisions, the judge is by no means the
sole sentencer.
Most critical, however, is the possibility that the capital juror,
informed that his or her sentencing role is advisory, will actualize
the dangers of bias toward a death sentence that Caldwell exposed.
Before invalidating these statutes or voiding death sentences im-
posed under them, courts ought not require proof that jurors ac-
tually were adversely influenced by the divided sentencing roles. It
is sufficiently intolerable that even the risk of such a phenomenon
exists.
The Caldwell Court set out a strict test for determining whether
diminished sentencer responsibility so inheres in a sentencing pro-
cedure as to render it constitutionally invalid: "Because we can not
say that this effort had no effect on the sentencing decision, that
decision does not meet the standard of reliability that the Eighth
Amendment requires."208 There is, simply, no way that one can
confidently conclude that the jury override statutes of Alabama,
Florida, and Indiana do not yield such a result. Such a degree of
unreliability in a capital sentencing scheme is constitutionally intol-
erable.
508 472 U.S. 320, 341 (1985) (emphasis added).
